

RELIGIOUS LOVE INTERFACES WITH SCIENCE:

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Thomas Jay Oord

(In Progress)

Science or Love? To which should we turn to explain our existence and to make the future world a better place in which to live?

A growing number of scholars are not satisfied with this “either science or love” question. A field of interest and body of work is emerging based on the belief that theories of love, especially religious love, must take into account truths from scientific investigation and speculation in scientific theory. Exactly how scholars involved in this emerging discipline believe love and science should be related and/or integrated varies greatly. What those in this budding field share in common, however, is the belief that issues of love are of paramount importance and that the findings and theories in various scientific disciplines – whether social or natural – must be brought to bear upon how love is understood.

This annotated bibliography includes a variety of literature either directly related to science-and-love issues or supporting literature for those issues. This listing is by no means exhaustive; additional entries will be added in the future and summary comments made. In short, this is a work in progress.

What makes this annotated bibliography unique is that it approaches the love-and-science discussion from the perspective of religion. This means neither that all of the books listed are of a specific religious nature nor that these authors consider themselves religious – although most books and authors do reflect a religious orientation. Rather, these works should be considered especially significant for those who wish to address the love-and-science field from a decidedly religious perspective.

A cursory glance at the literature in this domain reveals that various classical expositions of love continue to influence contemporary scholars. For instance, Plato’s work on *eros*, especially in his *Symposium*, provides material with which contemporaries still reckon. The work and words of Jesus, Aristotle, St. Paul, Mo-Tzu, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas,

Guatama, Dionysius, St. Francis of Assisi, Martin Luther, John Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, Sri Ramakrishna, Soren Kierkegaard and Ghandi also exert influence upon contemporary minds.

The contemporary discussion of love in the West, however, was initiated by Anders Nygren's theological arguments in his classic, *Agape and Eros* (1957 [1930]). Nygren championed a view heavily influenced by Martin Luther's theology, and Nygren believed this view to be supported by Christian Scripture. Prominent among those in the mid-twentieth century who reacted to his arguments were Martin C. D'Arcy, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and Daniel Day Williams. Today, many scholars proffering a theology of love still engage Nygren's ideas.

Nygren and his respondents rarely if ever explicitly addressed how science affects or is affected by the issues of love. Sociologist Pitirim Sorokin is credited with authoring the classic work in the love-and-science discussion. In his mid-twentieth century tome, *The Ways and Power of Love*, Sorokin considers seven aspects of love, including religious, ethical, ontological, physical, biological, psychological and social aspects. While the book often cites spiritual and religious figures and ideas, the majority of the author's interests revolve around love's psychological and social aspects. In his latter years, Sorokin established the Harvard Research Center for Creative Altruism due to his convictions about the power and importance of love.

A major issue at the heart of the love-and-science field -- and an issue that emerges often in the discussion -- is question of the nature and definition of love itself. Love is, as Mildred Bangs Wynkoop has said, a notoriously ambiguous "weasel word." "Love" in the English language conveys meanings that other languages employ a variety of words to convey. In addition, when some use "love," they mean for it to be taken exclusively as an unqualified good. This use derives from Hebrew heritage, and it might be called the "*hesed* love tradition" (*hesed* is a Hebrew word often translated "steadfast love"). Others use "love" to refer to either good or bad actions, and this usage arises out of what might be called the "virtue and vice love tradition." In this latter tradition, one adds a qualifier to love such as "proper" or "appropriate" when referring to an unconditional good.

Not only is the definition of love up for debate, but a great deal of discussion arises about which type of love is best, most appropriate, or most valuable. In this deliberation, three classic Greek words, what might be called the "archetypes of love," take center stage: *agape*, *eros*, and *philia*.

Nygren's claims about the superiority of *agape* kicked off a modern debate about the meaning and legitimacy of the archetypes. Scholars of the Christian canon have convinced most today, however, that Nygren's claim to have grounded his *agape* convictions in Scripture reflect his own theological orientation to a greater extent than what the biblical text actually supports. Many have also reacted against Nygren's theological and philosophical assumptions. For instance, many feminist scholars contend that *agape*, as Nygren conceives it, sustains harmful attitudes and ways of living; they prefer instead the value-affirming archetype *eros*. One of more important contemporary partners in this debate, Edward Collins Vacek, argues that *philia* should receive honored status above the other two loves. Those active in the current debates

often work carefully to persuade others that particular definitions of these three love archetypes are especially useful or significant.

In the love-and-science dialogue, *agape* is often mentioned as the love-type that must somehow be accounted for in scientific theory. A survey of the literature, however, reveals that participants in this dialogue attribute widely diverse meanings to *agape*. It has been equated with self-sacrifice, equal-regard, unlimited love, repaying evil with good, altruism, unconditional love, universal acceptance of others, divine love, gift-love, bestowal, the mutuality of God-self-others relations, religious love, and pure love, among other phrases. Because these definitions of *agape* are significantly different, they generate or reflect widely divergent agendas, expectations, and religious orientations. What Robert Adams says of *agape* as it relates to the specifically Christian context applies to the love-and-science discussion: “‘Agape’ is a blank canvas on which one can paint whatever ideal of Christian love one favors.”

The picture painted on the theoretical love canvas typically has a great deal to do with how the love-artist understands what it means to be human. Who humans are and of what they are capable obviously influences what can plausibly be said about their capacity for and motivation to express love. Not surprisingly, issues related to human nature arise to fore in contemporary love-and-science discussions. Whether explicitly or implicitly, this influence can be observed in scholarship of such sciences as genetics, physics, medicine, psychology, biology, sociology, neurology.

One of the better volumes to illustrate these fruits and possibilities found in the love-and-science discussion is *Altruism and Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Dialogue*, edited by Stephen G. Post, et. al. The volume specifically addresses a major focus in the love-and-science dialogue: the relationship between, authenticity, and origin of altruism and egoism. Among other things, essayists want to know whether humans and other complex organisms are inevitably egoistic if less complex organisms are inevitably egoistic. And if humans are not inevitably egoistic, does this mean that less complex nonhumans are not “programmed” to be selfish as well? Scholars wonder about the extent to which humans share traits and features with organisms that are typically not thought of as expressing give-and-take love. Especially prominent in this volume are the scientific disciplines currently most influential in setting the tone of the love-and-religion exchange: biology, psychology, and neurology.

The participant entering the love-and-science fray with religious concerns in mind will want to inquire into how science might shape what should be said about human nature. For instance, a Buddhist who agrees with the Dalai Lama that humans are essentially compassionate and good must reckon, in some way, with the claims by some scientists that all organisms, including humans, are invariably selfish. By contrast, a Christian who endorses the theological claim that humans are totally depraved and can only act lovingly if supernaturally enabled must reckon, in some way, with the claims by some scientists that organisms, especially humans, can act lovingly despite not witnessing to divine action in their lives.

The scope of one’s love interests is an issue that engenders diverse reflection. Some contend that love should be expressed to all, and preferences to those near and dear undermine the authenticity of genuine love. This approach, however, seems at odds with dominant theories in sociobiology, such as kin selection and group-selection, which point toward evidence that

supports the claim that creatures are more altruistic toward their genetic relatives or local communities. Others argue that love can only be expressed toward those with whom one is closely related. Perhaps the question to be answered is, Can a balance be achieved such that love can be simultaneously universal and preferential?

The idea that humans may properly love themselves has been debated throughout religious history. The love-and-science discussion often adds either an evolutionary, psychological, or genetic twist to this old debate. Is self-love ever appropriate? Should self-love be regarded as morally equivalent with other-love. If altruism requires self-sacrifice, does this mean that regard for one's own interest is at odds with altruism?

Theory and research in the scientific realm also places into question the status of creaturely freedom. The vast majority of contemporary love ethicists contend that freedom is required for creaturely love. But this freedom-determinism debate has a long history in religion, and it appears that most scientists do not regard nonhumans as acting freely. Is human freedom a necessary illusion? Did freedom for love emerge at some point in the evolutionary adventure of life? Or do all organisms possess a degree of freedom, meaning that degrees of freedom exist even at the most basic levels of existence examined by physicists?

Earlier I noted that how one understands love says a great deal about what one understands human nature to be. But must humanity be the originator of how theists conceive of love? To put the question another way, should theologies of love that interface with science start from "above," by considering divine love, or begin "below," by examining creaturely love?

Karl Barth, one of the 20th century's greatest theologians, would undoubtedly want any theological discussion with science to begin with divine love. Today, Barth's theological heirs and those called "Radical Orthodox" theologians would likely agree. From a different orientation, present-day Continental theologians often argue that one must set aside scientific questions related to ontology if one is to make progress in conceiving of love adequately. Those who argue that theology should begin from above are often reacting to "theologies" they believe both start from below and end up below. A crucial issue in the present love-and-science debate is how to decide which vision of God serves as the most adequate basis for speaking about love.

One reason Anders Nygren's notions of love have been so heavily criticized in the past half century is that the theory of *agape* he advocates presents a vision of a God who acts unilaterally, is not truly affected by others, and does not act in give-and-take relations that we understand love to entail. A short-hand way many contemporary theologians critique this vision is to say that Nygren does not present a "suffering God." In the classical sense, suffering simply means being affected or influenced by another; in the contemporary sense, suffering typically has to do with feeling pain. Most contemporary love theologians argue that God suffers in both senses.

Although the idea that God is affected by creatures has been a dominant theme in religious piety, it was not until in the mid-twentieth century that Charles Hartshorne and other process theists formulated sophisticated philosophical and theological formulations to account for a relational deity. Divine love was later to be dubbed, "Creative-Responsive" by process theologians John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin. One of the classic theological love texts

to be considered by present-day love-and-science scholars is *The Spirit and Forms of Love*, by process theologian Daniel Day Williams. The resources in the process tradition for conceptualizing love led George Newlands to write that “love has come to the fore particularly in process thought in America.”

The notion that God relates with the world and thus suffers is no longer the exclusive domain of process theists – if it ever really was previously. What might be called “Kenotic Theology,” exemplified well in Jürgen Moltmann’s writings, also supposes that God suffers. God loves from abundance, claims Moltmann, and through self-emptying and self-limitation God loves into being a partially independent world. A recent volume of essays edited by John Polkinghorne explores these kenotic themes. The key difference between process and the majority of kenotic theologies is that the latter argue that God’s relations with the world are essentially voluntary while the former contend that God necessarily relates with nondivine individuals.

The themes of divine relatedness and suffering are adopted by many whose orientations extend beyond process and kenotic theologies. Feminist theologians have argued that God is not only relational, but deity also has desires concerning and finds value in creation. Trinitarian theologians place the locus of divine love relations within the Trinity itself, and God’s interaction with the world somehow reflects intraTrinitarian relationships. Openness theologians reflect many of these same themes, while arguing that God’s love entails divine openness to the world and to a partially unknown future. Many biblical scholars are suggesting that themes of divine suffering and relationality are strongly supported by the Christian/New and Hebrew/Old Testaments.

The relationship between divine love and divine power is also a perennial subject for discussion. In the love-and-science conversation, the topic arises especially in relation to two concerns: the creation of the universe and the problem of evil. It seems to many that a God with the power of creating a universe ought to have the power to prevent genuinely evil occurrences. If such a creative God fails to prevent genuine evil, can we plausibly say that this God is perfectly loving after all? However, to argue that God’s actions toward the world are limited only to persuasive love seems to deny that God has the capacity to create something from nothing (or something from chaos). In these discussions, the topic of divine coercion arises.

How one believes God acts in and toward the world affects the ethical scheme one supposes is most adequate. To some the fact that existence has evolved a certain way suggests that humans ought to live and love a certain way. The question at the heart of this issue is often proposed in this way: Does it imply ought?

The literature on ethics examined in this annotated bibliography reflects a gamut of ethical approaches. Some love ethicists stress the paramount importance of developing virtues, especially love. Others turn to saints and role-models as the impetuses for loving action. Many stress the importance of the actor’s context and what the actor expects will be the outcome of his or her actions. Others suggest that love simply arises out of the particular way lovers see the world. Some love ethicists urge their readers to follow the teachings of a particular religious leader, religious text, or religious community. Each of these basic theoretical assumptions are

used in the love-and-science conversation to propose proper responses to issues such as marriage, friendship, abortion, euthanasia, cloning, genetic engineering, politics, sex, etc.

What follows is the aforementioned annotated bibliography. Written materials are placed alphabetically into one of five categories: 1. Classic Love Texts, 2. Emphasis Upon Ethics, 3. Primarily Philosophical, 4. Primarily Religious, and 5. Primarily Scientific. While an argument might be made for almost all of the materials to be placed in multiple categories, only a few texts are cross-listed.

I. CLASSIC LOVE TEXTS:

D'Arcy, Martin C. *The Mind and Heart of Love, Lion and Unicorn: A Study in Eros and Agape*. Cleveland: World, 1964.

D'Arcy's work provides a classic Roman Catholic response to Anders Nygren's Lutheran-influenced classic, *Agape and Eros*. D'Arcy's quotation best sums up his thesis in *The Mind and Heart of Love*: "The simplest statement of the law which governs what is highest and lowest in the Universe can be called that of 'Give and Take'" (14). Because this law of giving and taking -- which D'Arcy identifies with *agape* and *eros* -- is at the heart of all living things God creates, both giving and taking are part of legitimate Christian love. D'Arcy explicitly supports this thesis by drawing from varieties of literature, a phenomenological philosophy, the notions of the *animus* and *anima*, and a metaphysics of essence and existence.

The bulk of *The Mind and Heart of Love* consists of D'Arcy's discussion of important works on love with special attention given to a phenomenological account of love's nature. "The notions of love and of the self are universal," concludes D'Arcy, "and most must have a fair idea of what they mean because they have their own experience to guide them and a long heritage of common sense and wisdom.

The backbone for D'Arcy's most basic claims concerning human love is his analysis of the human self. Each person has an *animus* and *anima*, D'Arcy contends, and this composition contains the clues to the workings of love. The *anima* and the *animus* correspond with the archetypal loves *agape* and *eros*. Although the two loves of the self differ significantly, both *agape* and *eros* must live together in each person. This reveals why giving and receiving are inherent in all life.

The differing characteristics of a taking *animus/eros* and a giving *anima/agape* can be listed as such:

<u><i>Animus</i></u> (Lion)	<u><i>Anima</i></u> (Unicorn)
Reason	Will
Order	Irrational
Mind	Soul/Heart
Active	Passive
Self-regard	Self-sacrifice
Egocentric	Altruistic
Masculine	Feminine
To be for itself	To be for others
Life	Death
Possessing	Being Possessed
Taking	Giving
<i>Eros</i>	<i>Agape</i>

The self-regarding *animus* exhibits itself in the world of reason. It is set on self-realization and proceeds from the Aristotelian argument that humans necessarily love themselves even when loving others. The *animus* is a taking or receiving love. The self-denying *anima*, on the other hand, cares little for its dignity or rights. This love prefers mutuality and fusion with the beloved. *Anima* is giving, self-sacrificial, and altruistic. Its impulse is to seek to belong to another. The *anima* is a giving love. Each love makes itself felt to some degree in its bid to dominate the self, and each, whether *animus/agape* or *anima/eros*, “can be good or bad” (220).

The lives of humans involve a more or less successful attempt to harmonize these two elements of the self. This means that, according to D’Arcy, “the principle of give and take has to be harmonized in all phases of love” (83). In perfect love, the *animus* and *anima* rejoice together in an undivided act. “The animus and the anima give each other mutual assistance and love,” which means that “*eros* and *agape* are not enemies, but friends” (344).

At its best, the natural union of *anima* and *animus* is short-lived. A supernatural act is needed to secure lasting harmony. Because the ideal harmony is not achieved naturally, humans experience existential angst. Christian theologians identify this lack of harmony with the Fall.

D’Arcy means for his phenomenologically-based hypothesis to extend to creatures other than humans; animals share this twofold movement of giving and taking. As D’Arcy puts it, “To give . . . , as well as to take, is inherent in all living organisms” (243), a point said to be illustrated in the basic impulses of all things for self-preservation and contribution to the order of the whole. However, the striking difference that separates humans from animals, according to D’Arcy, is that human love has spiritual implications while animal love does not. “The difference can be best expressed in saying that the higher actions of man have an intrinsic value and that man has a personal dignity” (15).

After establishing his phenomenologically-based hypothesis that love involves both giving and taking, D’Arcy turns to the classical philosophy of essence and existence to secure a metaphysical basis for this hypothesis. He draws upon philosopher Hunter Guthrie’s work to fulfill this intention. The philosophy of essence and existence that D’Arcy appropriates supposes that, although all persons share a common essence as humans, they differ from one another in their unique existence

The existential self, being contingent and unstable, seeks union with a necessary, stable absolute. Both the love of the human essence and the love of a human being’s existence need each other. Without the essential love, the love of existence is without a backbone, and, without the movement of the existential love toward the Absolute, the essential love will substitute a pseudo-absolute for the true One. This means that the love of the essential self can only be subsidiary and find its role as a minor partner to the other love. “The two loves must implement each other,” says D’Arcy, but “the essential one must be subordinated to the love which reaches up to the God whose

name is, 'I am Who am'" (291).

From the preface to the final pages of *The Mind and Heart of Love*, D'Arcy speaks of creaturely love as essentially involving both give and take. D'Arcy expresses this theme when he claims that "perfect love is mutual giving and taking, possessing and being possessed" (263). More specifically giving and taking, claims D'Arcy, are necessary elements for love. If *eros* were to be eliminated, as Nygren had suggested, *agape* would wither away in its solitude. The theme that perfect love involves both give and take is also implicit in the most quoted phrase from D'Arcy's book: "*Eros* and *agape* are not enemies, but friends."

DeRougemont, Denis. *Love in the Western World*. Trans. Montgomery Belgion. rev. ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, [1940] 1983.

DeRougemont claims in this classic that the modern notion of romantic love originated in medieval courtly love. He further argues that this medieval notion of romantic love cannot form a proper basis for Christian marriage.

The author traces the tradition of courtly love from the 12th century through the 19th century to modern day. He begins with the legend of Tristan and Isolde and notes the inescapable conflict between passion and marriage. Passion is grounded in an *eros* that is often spoken of by the poets. Such *eros* is implicitly selfish and finds its only consummation in death, which means that romantic love includes an unconscious death wish.

The selfishness of passion is at odds with the mature *agape* love found in Christian marriage. The author claims that his underlying belief is a phrase from Heraclitus, "opposites cooperate, and from their struggle emerges the most beautiful harmony." DeRougemont does not argue that passion should be eliminated from marriage; rather marriage cannot be founded upon passionate love alone.

Fromm, Erich. *The Art of Loving*. New York: Harper and Row, 1956.

The renowned psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm, offered this classic work more than a half century ago to explore the capacities and expressions of love. He argues that love is not mere sentiment expressed without any effort. Love is most completely and genuinely offered by one who has developed his or her total person. One can begin to understand love by the practicing of expressing love rather than the waiting to be loved by others.

In this classic, Fromm argues famously that one cannot adequately love others unless one loves oneself. Among the topics he addresses are the love between parent

and child, brotherly love, motherly love, erotic love, self love, and love of God. Overall, love provides an answer to the problem of human existence. The art of love demands practice and concentration; it demands insight and understanding. Love is “the force which keeps the human race together, the clan, the family, the society. The failure to achieve it means insanity or destruction – self destruction or destruction of others. Without love, humanity would not exist for a day” (15).

Heschel, Abraham. *The Prophets*. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1969.

King, Martin Luther. *Strength to Love*. Cleveland: Collins World, 1963.

This classic text is comprised of fifteen sermons preached by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. The sermons provide a glimpse into the most fundamental notions driving King’s social compassion and Christian witness. Sermon titles include “A Tough Mind and a Tender Heart,” “On Being a Good Neighbor,” “Love in Action,” “Loving Your Enemies,” and “Pilgrimage to Non-Violence.”

In his sermon, “Loving Your Enemies,” King writes, “probably no admonition of Jesus has been more difficult to follow than the command to ‘love your enemies’” (47). Jesus surely understood the difficulty inherent in the act of loving one’s enemy. The responsibility of Christians is to discover the meaning of this command and seek to passionately live it out.

In answering the question, “how do we love our enemies,” King says that we must first develop and maintain the capacity to forgive. Second, we must see the goodness in those who hurt us. Third, we must not seek to defeat or humiliate the enemy, but to win the enemy’s friendship and understanding. “Jesus recognized that *love* is greater than *like*. When Jesus bids us to love our enemies, He is speaking neither of *eros* nor *philia*; He is speaking of *agape*, understanding, and creative, redemptive good will for all men” (50).

Lewis, C. S. *The Four Loves*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960.

The author is one of the most important theologians of the 20th century, although his scholarly discipline was literature. He examines four main types of love, with special concentration on two types of love he calls “Gift-love” and “Need-love.”

In his first chapter, Lewis identifies the humblest and most widely diffused of the loves, that is, the loves and likings at the sub-human level. Following an examination of

sub-human love, he moves to discuss a love that he calls “affection.” Affection comes from the Greek love word *storge*. The third chapter is devoted to friendship love, from the Greek work *philia*. This friendship love is the least of the natural loves, “the least instinctive organic, biological, gregarious, and necessary” (58). Friendship should be distinguished from community love, because communities require cooperation. Friendship love by contrast is free from instinct, free from duty, and free from the need to be needed. Following an examination of friendship, Lewis addresses *eros*. By *eros* Lewis refers to “the love in which lovers are in,” i.e., romantic love.

In the book’s final chapter Lewis addresses charity. Charity is ‘Gift-love’ and the primal ‘Gift-love’ comes from the divine energy. While Lewis claims that “to love at all is to be vulnerable” (121), he also claims that God is self-sufficient. “In God there is no hunger that needs to be filled, only plenteousness that desires to give. The doctrine that God was under no necessity to create is not a piece of dry scholastic speculation. It is essential” (126). Also, “God, who needs nothing, loves into existence, holy, superfluous creatures in order that He may love and perfect them” (127).

After God loves into existence holy, superfluous creatures, God implants in those creatures both the Gift-loves and the Need-loves. Gift-love comes by grace and we call it charity. God also gives a supernatural Need-love of God and a supernatural Need-love of other creatures. It is through these two gifts that creatures have a longing for God and a love for others.

Meilaender, Gilbert. *Friendship: A Study in Theological Ethics*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

This classic study in theological ethics is written to argue that *philia* deserves an honored place within Christian ethics. Meilaender notes that at one time *philia*, rather than *agape* or charity, was the common way to understand love. However, *agape* displaced *philia* in Christian thought, and the author attempts to think theologically about this displacement in this book. *Friendship* examines the tension between *philia* and *agape* and probes the significance of this tension for Christian thought experience.

Each chapter explores a way in which *philia*, as a preferential bond, is important for understanding theological ethics. While *agape* is to be shown even to the enemy, *philia* is a mutual bond marked by inner reciprocities. While *agape* is said to be characterized by the fidelity and changelessness of God in covenant, *philia* is recognized to be the subject of change. While *agape* has been used to designate the search for a suprahistorical resting place in God, *philia* is the noblest thing aspired to in civics. While *agape* understands one’s vocation as the supremely important form of service to neighbor, *philia* emphasizes the bond of relationship toward those with personal significance.

In all of these contrasts, the author notes that the central element in their tension

is the preferential character of friendship. “Whatever its dangers, friendship is surely a bond of great significance for human life. No adequate theological ethic can fail to make place for it. When Christ came into this world, he came to his own, John’s Gospel tells us. And the divine love which Christ displays -- God’ *agape* -- cannot therefore be entirely alien to the needs and possibilities of our human nature” (105).

Montagu, Ashley. ed. *The Meaning of Love*. New York: Julian, 1953.

Montagu edits this volume of essays on love, written by a variety of scientists, physicians, and a theologian in the early 1950’s. Among the authors are Abraham Maslow, Pitirim A. Sorokin, and James Luther Adams. The editor writes that these essays find their purpose in “helping to liberate the love that is within, to enable more people to understand, feel, and enjoy the great power that is within them, the need which they have to give and receive love” (v). Montagu believes that inquiring into the various meanings of love may give clues for understanding love and the capacity to express love more adequately.

Nygren, Anders. *Agape and Eros*. tr. Philip S. Watson. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

Anders Nygren’s mid-twentieth century work, *Agape and Eros*, is monumentally important for the contemporary dialogue between science and theologies of love. When examining Nygren’s hypotheses pertaining to love, Gene Outka concludes, “whatever the reader may think of [*Agape and Eros*], one may justifiably regard this work as the beginning of the modern treatment of the subject” (*Agape* 1972, 1). Nygren’s work is not so important for its substantive contributions to this dialogue. He fails to consider the science of his day, and this work is almost exclusively theological in orientation. Furthermore, contemporary biblical and theological scholars have been almost uniformly rejected his particular *agape* and *eros* love hypotheses.

What makes Nygren’s tome so important to the current science and theologies of love interface is the book’s formal contribution: *Agape and Eros* implanted on the Western psyche the notion that when the word “*agape*” is used to speak of love, we refer to something distinctive. “*Agape*” has come to function as a kind of code word, although to what exactly is being referred varies dramatically from author to author. Although biblical scholars have almost unanimously rejected the claim that *agape* holds special status in Christian scripture and tradition, the perceived significance of *agape* persists today thanks in large part to *Agape and Eros*.

Nygren states that his purpose in authoring the book is “to investigate the meaning of Christian love” and “illustrate the main changes it has undergone in the

course of history” (27, 39). Such an investigation is important because love occupies the central place in Christian theology and piety. Furthermore, if one has access to “the distinctive character of the Christian conception of love,” says Nygren, the contrasts between it and inauthentic Christian loves will emerge (29).

According to Nygren, *agape* is the only authentically Christian love: “nothing but that which bears the impress of *agape* has a right to be called Christian love” (92). “*Agape* is the center of Christianity, the Christian fundamental motif *par excellence*” (48). The other main type of love, *eros*, is not only non-Christian, it has proven to distort authentic faith whenever Christian theologians have embraced it. *Agape* and *eros* originally had nothing to do with each other, because they belong to two “entirely separate spiritual worlds, between which no direct communication is possible” (31-32). In addition, each type of love suggests a different attitude toward life.

The author divulges what he means *agape* when he lists what he believes are this love’s essential aspects: 1. *Agape* is spontaneous and unmotivated. 2. *Agape* is indifferent to value. 3. *Agape* is creative. 4. *Agape* is the initiator of fellowship with God. The first two features of *agape* reveal that the explanation for God’s love is not found in its object. Divine *agape* is spontaneous in that it does not look for something that, as Nygren says, could be adduced as its motivation. By the fact that divine love seeks those who do not deserve it and can lay no claim to it, *agape* is manifest most clearly in its spontaneous and unmotivated character. The third feature is, according to Nygren, the deepest reason for *agape*’s uniqueness; it indicates that love is God’s creative activity. Love creates value in the one who is without inherent value. Fourth, *agape*, as the initiator of fellowship with God, discloses that God must come to meet humans and offer them fellowship.

Having explained what he means by *agape*, Nygren addresses the meaning of *eros*. Although he never gives a firm definition of this love, he identifies it both with the inclination toward the sensual expressed in mystery-piety and with the drive to transcend the sensual that Plato expresses in its highest form. *Eros* in mystery-piety is the vulgar *eros* of the sense-world; *eros* in Plato is the heavenly striving for the transcendent world of ideas. While Nygren finds no connection between vulgar *eros* and *agape*, heavenly *eros* is *agape*’s chief rival. In both its vulgar and heavenly versions, however, the *agape* differs from *eros* in kind, not degree. Nygren argues that the negative consequences of Hellenistic thought in general, and *eros* theology in particular, have invariably led to a distortion of pure, Christian love theology. “When Christianity tried to express itself in Platonic terms,” he contends, “the *agape* motif inevitably underwent a transformation” (54).

Nygren considers how the Christian Church has appropriated the two love motifs in history. In his view, the history of Christian ideas proceeds in a rhythm, alternating between synthesis and reformation. A reformation in the history of Christian love occurs whenever *agape* shatters the synthesis constructed between it and *eros*. The two historical figures that illustrate this synthesis and reformation best, according to Nygren, are Augustine and Luther. Augustine constructed an illegitimate synthesis of

agape and *eros*; Luther's reformation set *agape* in its proper place as the only authentically Christian love.

One of the most important turning points in the history of Christian love occurred in Augustine's thought. In fact, Augustine's conception of Christian love is the most influential in all of Christian history, according to Nygren, surpassing even the influence of the New Testament. Augustine's theory of Christian love must be regarded, according to Nygren, as a continuation of the endless discussion of ancient philosophy about what is the highest good. The Christian command to love, according to Augustine, answers philosophy's question of how the highest good can be attained. This good, which is the eternal, transcendent, self-sufficient *eudaemonia*, is attained through a complete synthesis of *agape* and *eros*. The meeting of the *eros* and *agape* motifs produces a characteristic third love that Augustine calls "*caritas*," which is neither *eros* nor *agape*. Augustine's emphasis upon God's unmerited descent to humanity represents the *agape* element of *caritas*. His emphasis upon the necessity of virtue in humanity's ascent to God represents the *eros* element of *caritas*. However, what makes *caritas* inauthentic Christian love, according to Nygren, is its inclusion of *eros* as ascent to God.

In the latter part of the book, Nygren turns to Luther as the one whose thought reestablishes the correct place of *agape* in Christian thought; the Protestant Reformation marked a time in history during which true Christian love (*agape*) was once again rightly elevated. Luther brought about this correction by smashing Augustine's illegitimate synthesis of *eros* and *agape* in the doctrine of *caritas*. Several factors were at work in this demolition. At the center was Luther's personal struggle against the upward tendency of *caritas*. This struggle resulted in his rejection of every idea of merit. He also rejected doctrines that implied the possibility of ascent to God by way of reason or mysticism. Luther ruthlessly rejected any attempt to ennoble and refine self-love, insisting it be annihilated.

Unlike Christian theologians who had come before, says Nygren, Martin Luther insisted upon a purely theocentric love. In doing this, Luther proclaimed that fellowship with God was possible on the basis of sin, not of holiness. In this regard, Nygren writes: "The deepest difference between Catholicism and Luther can be expressed by the following formula; in Catholicism: fellowship with God is on God's own level, on the basis of holiness; in Luther: fellowship with God is on our level, on the basis of sin. In Catholicism, it is a question of a fellowship with God motivated by some worth -- produced, it is true, by the infusion of *caritas* -- to be found in man; in Luther, fellowship with God rests exclusively on God's unmotivated love, justification is the justification of the sinner.

Nygren concludes by emphasizing Luther's belief that humans themselves do not produce Christian love for the neighbor; this love must come down from heaven. God employs humans as instruments so that, as Nygren says, "the Christian is not an independent center of power alongside God" (734). Luther thinks of the Christian as a tube that passes love received from above to the neighbor below. The tube/Christian

makes no contribution to the character or shape of this love. Unlike Augustine's *caritas*, a love that can only use the neighbor to get to God, Luther's *agape* love addresses the neighbor *as* neighbor. In fact, Luther claims that love for God is none other than love for neighbor.

Outka, Gene. *Agape: An Ethical Analysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.

Outka provides an ethical analysis from an analytic perspective of Christian theological writing pertaining to *agape* from writers 1930 to 1970. Among the central figures that he discusses are M. C. D'Arcy, Gerard Gillemann, Soren Kierkegaard, Reinhold Niebuhr, Anders Nygren, and Paul Ramsey. This work is still one of the very best because of its rigorous analysis of love issues.

Outka is not so much interested in offering his own proposals about how best to understand *agape*, nor is he interested in proposing a particular theological scheme. Rather, Outka analyzes prominent texts with an eye toward how their authors understand *agape* as ethics. "I am convinced that many of the historic ethical concerns of the Judeo-Christian tradition have been encapsulated in the 'love language,' and one ought to try to understand more clearly just what has been meant within that language" (5).

In the first chapter, Outka addresses what love as a normative, ethical principal or standard means. His concentration is upon how one's understanding of *agape* affects how one understands neighbor-love. Outka contends that crucial aspects of *agape* include the fact that *agape* is independent and unalterable. "Regard is for every person qua human existent, to be distinguished from those special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish particular personalities from each other" (9). Furthermore, Outka contends that *agape* entails a basic equality whereby one's neighbors' well-being is as valuable as another's neighbor's well-being.

In chapters two and three, Outka addresses how various authors understand *agape* as related to loving oneself and to acting for justice. Chapter four engages how *agape* is related to various dominant ethical schemes and what Outka calls "subsidiary rules." The author notes that almost all of the authors do not equate *agape* with a particular given moral code. Chapter five includes the author's assessment of how *agape* might be understood as a virtue or aspect of one's character. Chapter six entails an examination of how various authors justify or support their contention that persons ought to love with *agape*. In other words, these are justifying reasons for why someone might regard others with equal-regard. In the seventh chapter, Outka pays particular attention to the claims of Karl Barth with regard to *agape*. He notes that Barth understands *agape* as both equal-regard and-self sacrifice. Outka then addresses how Barth understands the major themes examined in the book's previous chapters.

In the book's final chapter, Outka explores various issues that have arisen in his examination of dominant texts on *agape*. He proposes what he believes to be the

fundamental content of human *agape* and some unresolved issues related to that content. “The meaning ascribed in the literature to love, in general, and to *agape*, in particular, is often characterized by both variance and ambiguity” (257-258). This has to do, says Outka, with the particular wider beliefs and theological schemes espoused by the writers of the love literature. It also has to do with the many ways in which the word love is used in the English language.

Upon reflecting on the matters that have arisen in his examination of love texts, Outka comes to a tentative suggestion for the meaning of *agape* as “an active concern for the neighbor’s well-being, which is somehow independent of particular actions of the other” (260). This means in part that the human must not let disparities and inequalities determine his or her basic attitudes towards others amongst others with whom he or she interacts.

Outka also notes that various problems arise when one understands self-sacrifice as the quintessence of *agape*. “Generally, therefore, I am inclined to think that instead of appraising self-sacrifice as the purest and most perfect manifestation of *agape*, the difficulties I have considered are voided if one allows it only *instrumental* warrant” (278). Regard of one’s self ought to be based upon the fact that he or she is a creature of God who is more than a means to some other end. Outka also notes that *agape* involves certain social and personal relations thus entailing an overlap between regard of others and social cooperation.

Sorokin, Pitirim. *The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation*. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation, (1954) 2002.

The Ways and Power of Love is a classic work in the science-and-love dialogue. Although Sorokin is known for his work in sociology, he also established the Harvard Research Center for Creative Altruism due to his conviction about the power and importance of love. This review refers to the 2002 edition published by the Templeton Foundation Press; the book was originally published in 1954.

Sorokin begins this large volume by considering seven aspects of love, including the religious, ethical, ontological, physical, biological, psychological and social. While the book often cites spiritual and religious figures and ideas, the majority of Sorokin’s interests revolve around the psychological and social aspects of love.

In his chapter, “The Five-Dimensional Universe of Psycho-Social Love,” Sorokin provides a heuristic device for understanding various dimensions of love. One dimension is love’s intensity, whereby love is considered to have low or high intense forms. The second dimension is extensivity, by which Sorokin means to denote the scope of love from love of oneself only to love of the whole universe. The third dimension of love is its duration, which refers to the time during which love is expressed - from a moment to an entire lifetime. The fourth dimension is purity, by which Sorokin means that the love that is free from egoistic motivation is purest. The fifth dimension is love’s adequacy, by which Sorokin means the

objective consequences of one's action in comparison to one's subjective goals. Using this five dimensional theme, Sorokin can explore the varieties of love by characterizing them as exemplifying certain types. For instance, some love may have low intensity but very high extensivity. Or love may have great high purity but a very short duration.

Sorokin considers love to be a type of energy, and he believes that the increase in the production of love energy to be of chief concern in our times. Love, as a commodity that can be produced, might be increased through a variety of ways. "Love, its properties, its empirical dimensions, the relationships between its dimensional variables, and, finally, the problems of the efficient production, accumulation, and distribution of love energy -- all of these open a vast, little known, and desperately field of exploration. At the present time mankind perhaps needs to explore this field more than any other" (46). In a chapter exposing the benefits of love, Sorokin lists the following: love stops aggression, love begets more love, love increases human vitality and longevity, love is an element in curing disease and sickness, love integrates the psyche of an individual, and love becomes a creative force for good in social movements.

In the second part of the book, Sorokin addresses basic mental and personal structures of humans as they relate to love. "The ultimate task of these studies is to find out the efficient ways of making persons more creative and altruistic. In order that this purpose may be fruitfully advanced, one has to have an adequate theory of the mental structure of the human personality and of the energies generated in operating through the human organism" (83).

Sorokin's own theory of human personality is that humans have four energies: the biologically unconscious or subconscious level, the biologically conscious level, the socio-culturally conscious, and what he calls the "supraconscious." The author is most interested in the supraconscious of an individual, by which he means that which manifests the greatest creative victories and what is most typically linked in humans with the divine. Theistic individuals often attribute this supraconscious as either God working through them or God inspiring in them to do some particular activity. It is this supraconscious intuition that informs the highest human creativity in virtually all the fields of inquiry, from religion to science. Sorokin appeals to the ideas and saints in a variety of religious traditions as evidence of those who acknowledge this supraconscious in the world. The perfectly integrated creative genius most in touch with the supraconscious is one in whom the five aspects of love operate at a high level. This means that "supreme love can hardly be achieved without a direct participation of the supra-conscious and without the ego-transcending techniques of its awakening" (125).

In the book's third section, Sorokin addresses various ways in which altruism might grow. To do this, he examines logical arguments, empirical evidence from various individuals throughout history, and testimonials. Sorokin places the great altruists of history in a three-fold typology.

The first, what he calls "fortunate altruists," are loving and friendly from childhood. The most important factor to understanding fortunate altruists is that these individuals were raised in a good family that loved them and expected them to be loving. "It is much easier

to grow in the family garden a large crop of creative altruists from newborn babies that it is to transform a grown-up egoist into an altruist” (205).

The second type of altruists, whom Sorokin calls “late altruists,” become altruistic because of a sharp turning point later in their lives. It appears that a deep inner war in the mind and values of the late altruist becomes the driving force that brings them to decide to act altruistically. Sorokin also finds that, although altruists participate in a variety of living situations, the overwhelming majority of outstanding altruists were born and raised in ordinary socio-cultural environments.

The third type of altruist, what Sorokin calls the “intermediary type.” These individuals turn to altruism at various points in life, and these turnings reflect milder transition periods.

Sorokin argues that merely accepting the truth of certain values as important is not enough for an individual to become an altruist. Rather, altruists are deeply permeated by the value of altruism, and this is evident in their ideas, emotions, feelings, volitions and actions. When altruism is purely intellectual and when it does not permeate one’s heart, emotions, and volitions, it does not produce loving results.

Part four is the longest section of *The Ways and Power of Love*. In it, Sorokin notes various techniques for the altruistic transformation of persons and groups. “The altruistic formation and transformation of human beings is an exceedingly delicate, complex, and difficult operation. There is no single magic procedure that can successfully perform it . . . to be effective, the methods must vary in accordance with the many conditions and properties of the individuals and groups” (287). Several chapters are given to listing what comes to be 26 different techniques for enhancing altruism. Subsequent to examining these techniques, Sorokin offers a chapter on various techniques of yoga, followed by the techniques of the monastics. He concludes with the techniques of “contemporary free brotherhoods,” such as Mennonites, Hutterites, and others.

The fifth and final part of the book Sorokin addresses the questions of in-group and out-group altruism. Unfortunately, in-group altruism tends to generate an out-group antagonism. “The more intense and exclusive the in-group solidarity of its members,” argues Sorokin, “the more unavoidable are the clashes between the group and the rest of humanity” (459). The universal or more extensive aspect of love ends up clashing with the narrow tribal in-group love. What is preferred is the universalization of altruism. “The universal sublime love is the supreme value around which all moral values can be integrated into one ethical system valid for the whole of humanity” (486). This means that tribal solidarities must be transcended if inter-human warfare is to be eliminated from the world.

Sorokin ends the chapter and the book with this quote: “By the mysterious forces of destiny, mankind is confronted with a stern dilemma: either to continue its predatory policies of individual and tribal selfishness that lead to its inevitable doom, or to embark upon the policies of universal solidarity that bring humanity to the aspired-for heaven on the earth. It is up to everyone of us which of the two roads we prefer to choose” (489).

The Ways and Power of Love is an essential text for those engaging in the dialog between theologies of love and science. Stephen G. Post writes in the introduction that this book is Sorokin's greatest work and "a classic text that transcends the limits of any particular era" (xxvii). The strengths of the text are many; the insights are vast. Unfortunately, however, some of the work is unsystematic and at the sections seem disconnected. The reader is left with the impression that, although Sorokin's insights ring true intuitively, there is a great deal more work to be done in carefully arguing and scientifically testing the various hypotheses he forwards.

Tillich, Paul. *Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

This preeminent 20th century Christian theologian argues in this small book that love, power and justice all imply an ontology and must be understood in aspects of being itself. It is in this book that he famously defines love as "the drive toward the unity of the separated" (25). He also refers to love as the moving power of life and believes all love includes qualities of *eros* and *agape*.

Tillich does not believe that one can speak of self-love in anything more than a metaphorical sense. After all, if love is the drive toward the reunion of the separated, it is difficult to speak meaningfully of self-love.

In his exposition of the nature of power Tillich notes that love is the foundation, not the negation, of power. Love is the ultimate principle of justice, although justice preserves what love unites. "The basic assertion about the relation of God to love, power and justice is made, if one says that God is Being-itself" (109). However, everything that one says about Being-itself, must be said symbolically.

The author's words about how divine love and power are related are also noteworthy. "Since God is love and His love is one with His power," contends Tillich, "He has not the power to force somebody into His salvation. He would contradict Himself. And this God cannot do" (114).

Toner, Jules. *The Experience of Love*. Washington, D.C.: Corpus, 1968.

Williams, Daniel Day. *The Spirit and the Forms of Love*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Williams's theology of love should be considered a classic expression of how someone inspired by the philosophical concerns of process philosophy and Christian faith might understand love, both human and divine. Given that process thought has

proven especially helpful for many in the science and religion dialogue, one would do well to mine the chapters of *The Spirit and the Forms of Love* for gems to orient one's work in the interface between science and theology.

Williams reveals his purpose for writing *The Spirit and the Forms of Love* as his attempt to answer the question, "What is the meaning and truth of the Christian assertions that God is love, that love to God and the neighbor are the two great commandments, that fulfillment of human love depends upon God's action of reconciliation, and that the love of God is the ground of all hope?" (vii) When beginning to answer these questions, Williams turns to Christian scriptures. Although expressions of love in the Old Testament are diverse, Williams contends that the meaning of love therein is nothing other than the meaning of God's historical dealing with humanity. According to Williams, what Christians mean by love grows out of Jesus' history.

Williams offers three typologies to illustrate three major forms of love in the Christian tradition. The first is the Augustinian synthesis of the New Testament faith and the Neo-platonic vision. Its characteristic is the attempt to bring the various human and divine loves into an ordered structure. The second type is the Franciscan, which is expressed in the free, radical expression of love in a sacrificial life. The third type is the Evangelical way, which centers upon two notions: (1) the loves of God and humans are to be understood within the affirmation of salvation by grace alone, and (2) grace gives the individual a new sense of vocation to be a servant of God in the secular order.

Neo-Platonic metaphysics have unfortunately often undermined Christian attempts to conceptualize Christian love adequately. When the main structure of Christian theology was formulated in the creeds, "the biblical faith in God became fused with the Neo-platonic doctrine of God as absolute being" (17). When Augustine sought to combine the biblical vision with Neo-platonic metaphysics, he ascribed to God all power and perfection (as completeness). This meant that temporality, change, becoming, and passivity were be ascribed to God. Neo-Platonic metaphysics denies the possibility that human determinations can alter God's experience, and the notion that God's experience is unalterable contradicts the broad biblical witness of God's interacting love.

"What would it mean," Williams wonders rhetorically as he transitions to proposing a process metaphysics to replace Neo-Platonism, "to relate the Christian doctrine of God to a metaphysical outlook in which God's being is conceived in dynamic temporal terms?"(9) It would mean something very different – something more intelligible and biblical. The "process" in process metaphysics designates this thought's indebtedness to a broad movement in modern thought that reconsiders metaphysical problems based on an evolutionary world-view and the temporal flow of experience. Williams avers that contemporary humanity is conscious of its radical historicity involving real freedom, possibilities yet unrealized, and an open-ended future that humans shape partly by their own decisions. Because of this and because the biblical God acts in a history where individuals have freedom, a philosophy should be championed that corresponds with general science, conceives of God in historical-temporal terms, and

also accounts for creaturely freedom.

In broad terms, Williams defines process theology as a perspective supposing that God is joined with the world in the adventure of real history where God and creatures have freedom to act and respond. Crucial to Williams's work is his insistence that similarities must exist between divine and human love. The analysis Williams performs is based upon this hypothesis: Whatever is present in the inescapable structures of human experience must be present in ultimate reality. After coming to a working hypothesis that accounts for the elements of those inescapable structures of experience -- particularly the experience of love, one then asks about the implications this account has for a doctrine of God.

What, asks Williams, are the ontological conditions that human love requires and how are these conditions reflected in divine love? He suggests three conditions. First, individuals must be in relation. Love requires (1) that real individuals each bring to relationship something that no other can bring and (2) that those individuals possess the capacity to take into account another's unique individuality.

Second, love requires a degree of freedom in the one loving. All loves and lovers have a historical context and thus absolute freedom is impossible. Freedom is always qualified by the physical, emotional, and historical circumstances in which love exists. Furthermore, contends Williams, the very nature of love includes affirming and accepting the freedom of the other. "Nothing is more pathetic than the attempt to compel or coerce the love of another, for it carries self-defeat within it. That which is coerced cannot be love, hence in love we will that the other give his love freely" (116). If God wills to love, and, above all, if God wills to *be* loved, God cannot entirely determine the love of the other. God gives freedom to creatures in order that they may love.

Third, what has been said about freedom, action, suffering, and communication, implies the categorical condition Williams calls "causality." According to him, love is meaningless without causality. Love "must be the kind of action, with whatever coercion is involved, which so far as possible leaves the other more free to respond" (120).

Fourth and finally, love requires that individuals -- including the divine individual -- be related. Loving not only requires a movement toward the other but also, says Williams, the capacity to be acted upon. Suffering is the language of feeling and of caring, and that is its importance for love. When humans love, then, they are a part of a history in which suffering is one condition of relationship. Divine love includes God "making himself vulnerable to receive into his being what the world does in its freedom," argues Williams, "and to respond to the world's actions. Process thought offers "a new metaphysical vision that embodies the conception of God as living, creative, and responsive to the world" (17).

The final chapters of the book are given to addressing particular issues that emerge in relation to the love scheme Williams proposes. Chapters address the incarnation, the atonement, self-sacrifice, sexuality, social justice, and the intellect.

2. EMPHASIS UPON ETHICS:

Allen, Diogenes. *Love: Christian Romance, Marriage, and Friendship*. Cowley Publications, 1987.

Gill, Robin. *Churchgoing and Christian Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Gilleman, Gerard. *The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology*. Maryland: Newman Press, 1961.

Gilleman's main purpose in the writing of this book is to reinstate charity as the fundamental "nourishing substance" of all the virtues. He writes as a Roman Catholic particularly influenced by the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Although Gilleman's work is more than 40 years old, it still remains a valuable work for those pursuing theologies of love and virtue ethics revolving around charity.

The author believes that the moral manuals have overstressed objective and individualistic bearings of moral theology and placed law, rather than love, as their dominant theme. Authentic Christian life is essentially the imitation of Christ; which implies that moral theology should not be legalistic.

The contemporary theological tradition from which Gilleman is oriented does not, according to him, place love as its central and fundamental concern. When charity as the form of the virtues informs ethics and theology, Christian thought is arighted. God must supernaturalize love in the Christian. This process makes possible the practical living out of love in one's life. In this way, "moral life appears as the expression of that mysterious, ambivalent being that is in incarnate spirit" (346). This entails the moral life as a distinct and actual continuation of the action of Christ on the cross. "It is the love of the Trinity, it is the intimate nature of God Himself, that we find at work in human activity -- under a very humble form, it is true, but ever so expressive" (347).

Gilman, E. James. *Fidelity of Heart: An Ethic of Christian Virtue*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

The author's intent is to take two philosophical - theological trends in Christian ethics, what he calls, "obediential dispositions" and "empathetic emotions," and weave

them together into a theory of Christian ethics. By obediential dispositions, the author refers to the tradition of character or virtue ethics. By empathetic emotions, the author refers to the tradition of moral passions in ethics.

The word, “heart,” in the title is used by the author to refer to a quality of human character consisting of two dimensions, dispositions or habits on one hand, and emotions on the other. Dispositional habits invite or elicit certain emotional attachments that are commensurate with their particular character trait. If a given habit is operative, the emotions relative to it will manifest themselves.

The author draws upon theological ethicists Alisdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas, as well as philosophers Aristotle and Aquinas for basic notions in character ethics. However, Gilman believes that these theologians and philosophers typically overlook the emotional aspect of Aristotle’s ethics. Gilman turns to philosopher Martha Nussbaum and theologian Edward Vacek for grounding to propose the emotional side of his Christian ethic of the heart. Emotions are powerful, moral forces that, when properly cultivated, function as reliable, moral guides. “This book aims to explicate the meaning of ‘fidelity of heart,’” says Gilman, “by showing how both obediential dispositions and empathetic emotions are essential dimensions of any community devoting itself passionately, intimately, and single-mindedly to following, and not just admiring, Christ” (8).

After a chapter in which Gilman suggests that the heart needs to be “reenfranchised,” he addresses in subsequent chapters three virtues of the heart: love, peace and justice. The book concludes with an exploration of what it means to have a faithful heart in the public life. Gilman turns to the virtue of compassion in this regard. He suggests that loving God, self, and others requires the follower of Jesus Christ to embrace a joyful sorrow that transforms enemies into friends. To pursue peace, according to Gilman, requires not just making peace; it also requires affirming and acting by the ways of pacifism.

Grant, Colin. *Altruism & Christian Ethics*. Cambridge: University Press, 2001.

This text comes in a series of books written to explore Christian ethics and various issues (e.g., family, priorities, power, and feminism). Grant argues that when ethics become separated from religion due to the influence of the social sciences, scholars end up seeing human beings as fundamentally self-interested. This book extends an analysis of secular and sacred literature with regard to altruism.

The key thesis “defended here is that altruism is a modern secular concept that betrays theological overtones, and the dismissal of the notion endangers the lingering theological sensibility it echoes” (xiii). Altruism becomes a parody of the self-giving love of Christianity. However, to dispense with altruism is to dispense with God and with the divine transformation of human possibilities. Altruism is a modern concept whose roots

lie in a Christian understanding of *agape*, which is defined by the author as the self-giving love that is seen to be characteristic of God and in which human beings are called to participate.

In his chapter, “The Elusiveness of Altruism,” Grant addresses the literature that attempts to define precisely what one means when one talks about acting egoistically and altruistically. He concludes that the notion of altruism corresponds with the emergence of the notion self-consciousness. This modern notion of the individual provides the basis for the emergence of issues of self-interest and altruism. The work of C. Daniel Batson plays a prominent role as providing empirical evidence for the existence of altruism, in striking contrast to the notion of egoism in socio-biology.

The second part of the book entitled, “Ideal Altruism,” addresses many of the philosophical and political notions of altruism. In his chapter, “Contract Altruism,” Grant addresses prominent versions of self-interest ethics and concludes that these versions suggest that ethics is either illusory, contradictory or unnecessary. In his chapter, “Constructed Altruism,” Grant addresses Immanuel Kant’s version of altruism as impartiality and John Rawl’s political alternative to altruism. Grant’s main point in this chapter is that each of these philosophers understands or adopts a view of what he calls “essential individualism.” Grant wonders if humans are not finally isolated individuals but rather inherently social beings. The notion of social beings fits into the sixth chapter, “Collegial Altruism.” In this context, the notions of empathy and sympathy as understood by philosophers (e.g., David Hume and feminist) come into play.

Grant titles the final part of the book, “Real Altruism,” because in this section he addresses more specifically how altruism is conceived of in Christian or theistic terms. Under the label, “Acute Altruism,” Grant addresses the Christian notion of *agape*. Grant’s preference for the work of Anders Nygren becomes evident here; the author addresses criticisms of Nygren’s classic *agape* theses. Grant concludes that “if proponents of *eros* make their case only by adopting something of the coloration of *agape*, and advocates of *philia* require the initiative of *agape* to achieve the mutuality they prize, this would seem to confirm Nygren’s insistence on the indispensability of *agape*” (177). In, “Absolute Altruism,” Grant explores the process notion of God as both altruistic and egoistic. He concludes that “as God may both give and receive, in ways appropriate to God, so self-fulfillment in other regard may both find expression in a wider, less deliberate, and less self-conscious sense of altruism” (217).

In the final chapter, “Actual Altruism,” the author’s own proposal comes forth. Altruistic behavior persists against the massive insistence that it is folly. And this persistence indicates that altruism, or something like it, is present in human life at a profound level. The term altruism tends to disappear in a context where a more relational, social view of life is assumed. Upon noting the many paradoxes that altruism entails, Grant concludes that *deliberate* altruism is impossible. Altruism is seen most profoundly in the lives of saints who direct their lives toward to religious ends rather than altruism in itself. This means that “altruism is achieved best where it is least intended” (250). “Unintentional altruism is most natural for the transcendence sponsorship of the

religious level where we are delivered from ourselves. It could be said that altruism is a test of the seriousness of religious vision” (250).

Hallett, Garth. *Priorities and Christian Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Martin, Mike W. *Love's Virtues*. Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1996.

Martin offers a philosophically rigorous yet highly accessible argument for the importance of developing the various virtues found in a robust notion of love. Martin argues that love encompasses a wide variety of virtue-structured ways in which persons value each other as having irreplaceable worth. In short, love is “a virtue-structured way to value persons” (1).

Although there are a variety of loves, Martin chooses to examine erotic love, defined as love involving sexual desires and monogamous marriage. By marriage, he means moral relationships involving sexual desires and long-term commitments to one's partner. His purpose in writing the book is to clarify the role of moral values in understanding this kind of love. This is a book that provides internal justification for marital love by examining the moral dimensions of love that make it desirable insofar as love's virtues are imbedded in marriage.

The book is divided into ten chapters, each of which, except the first, addresses particular virtues of love. The first chapter, “Love and Morality,” is one of the most important, because it frames the issues that the author highlights throughout the remainder of the work. Martin argues that love is internally related to morality: “Moral values define love as ways to value persons” (10). The notion of morality that he proposes is pluralistic insofar as Martin realizes that people have differing conceptions of moral ideals of goodness. These moral values enter into the very meaning of love by structuring love's relationships and shaping its experiences. In short, virtues and ideals enter into defining what love is.

Martin believes that moral philosophies and prominent ethical theories have failed to give love its proper place. Those moral theories that presuppose an impartiality paradigm give little attention to the preferential treatment that love often calls for. In proposing his own moral philosophy, Martin affirms an ethical pluralism that acknowledges objective value, affirms liberty and tolerance of diversity, and underscores the moral significance of personal caring relationships. “Love encompasses a variety of virtue-guided and virtue-structured ways to value persons. Understood within a pluralistic perspective, love makes possible morally creative forms of shared caring” (31).

In examining the particular virtues that shape and partly define love, Martin

begins with the virtue of caring. According to him, caring is the central virtue that defines love. It is central partly when it has good motives and intended objects, partly because it tends to produce good consequences, and partly because of its connections with other virtues. The object of genuine love is the well-being of the beloved together with the shared well-being of two lovers. This means that love that interweaves altruism and self-interest; in fact, Martin claims that it fuses them. “Love transcends the dichotomy between *eros* and *agape* by creating motives to promote the shared good of two or more people” (39). The caring involved in genuine love is “directed toward persons in their full individuality, motivated in part by a concern for their well-being intending with any luck to produce good consequences” (42). Caring is expressed in, conditioned on, enhanced or limited by, and in general interwoven with other virtues within a complex moral tapestry” (42).

For the remainder of the book, Martin examines by chapter the following virtues: faithfulness, sexual fidelity, respect, fairness, honesty, wisdom, courage and gratitude. Regarding the virtue of fairness, Martin argues that neither mutual consent nor 50-50 distribution of benefits and burdens is adequate for understanding fairness in terms of love. Instead, Martin advocates the idea of equal autonomy as the primary love criterion of fairness. Martin notes, however, that “although love is never entirely selfless, love includes a willingness to make sacrifices on behalf of one’s spouse” (116). Love intertwines the good of two people. Love contains elements of benevolence without being a disinterested altruism: it blends the self-interest of two persons so as to transcend the distinction between selflessness and selfishness.

With regards to the virtue of wisdom, Martin argues that wisdom is primarily understanding what love is, including love’s requirements, constituent values, and contributions to meaningful life. Wisdom is “knowing how to care for the person we love and putting that knowledge into practice” (147). “Knowing how to love implies knowing how to be honest, how to be faithful by establishing mutual commitment and arrangements reasonably designed to protect love, how to find the courage to confront dangers to relationships, how to be fair in balancing benefits and burdens, how to show gratitude for love” (148). In sum, Martin’s book is a top-notch book of moral philosophy concentrating upon love as the uniquely important touchstone for virtue ethics.

Meilaender, Gilbert. *The Limits of Love: Some Theological Explorations*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. *Love and Justice*. ed. D.B. Robertson. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1976.

Oord, Thomas Jay. "Love Archetypes and Moral Virtue," in *Contemporary Philosophy: Philosophic Research, Analysis and Resolution*. Vol. XXII, No. 1& 2, Jan/Feb & Mar/Apr 2000, 13-17.

Oord proffers definitions, distinctions, and hypotheses pertaining to love and moral virtue. Employing what he calls the "virtue and vice" love tradition, Oord defines proper love as acting intentionally, in sympathetic response to others, to attain a high degree of well-being given the degrees of ill and well-being possible for each act. Proper expressions of *agape*, *eros*, and *philia* are required to achieve greater degrees of overall well-being. Oord lists what each of these three love archetypes look like when they are vices -- either when deficient or in excess.

Outka, Gene. *Agape: An Ethical Analysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.

(See annotation in "1. Classic Love Texts" section.)

Outka, Gene. "Agapeistic Ethics." *A Companion to Philosophy of Religion*. Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997.

Pope, Stephen. "Love in Contemporary Christian Ethics," *Journal of Religious Ethics*. 23.1 (Spring 1995): 167.

Pope divides contemporary theories of love into what he calls "norm-centered" and "affective-centered" approaches. Norm-centered approaches entail either moral parity between the self and the other or entail self-subordination. Affective-centered approaches concentrate on the love for God as the central context for neighbor love.

Post, Stephen G. *Christian Love and Self-Denial: An Historical and Normative Study of Jonathan Edwards, Samuel Hopkins, and American Theological Ethics*. New York: University Press of America, 1987.

Post, Stephen G. *More Lasting Unions: Christianity, the Family, and Society*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000.

More Lasting Unions is a sequel to an earlier book written by Post titled, *Spheres of Love Toward a New Ethics of the Family*. This sequel covers the history of Christian thought and practice and then applies this to contemporary issues of social importance. “This book examines the deeper spiritual foundations of lasting unions in the context of western culture as it was shaped by Christianity,” explains Post, “and shows a continuing need for spirituality of marriage and family life that encourages us all to see the tremendous value in a deeper form of commitment than contemporary culture appears able to encourage” (1).

Post begins by providing a general interpretation of the data pointing to the adverse effects of the divorce culture; marriage and the family is at a crossroads in contemporary society. Christianity offers an alternative to this culture, because it powerfully endorses the overall value of the family and faithful marriage. “This endorsement is a profoundly essential one to Christianity,” claims Post, “and must inform its endeavor to positively affect culture and society” (8). He argues that as a culture we seem to have forgotten that fact that family life is the foundation upon which society rests. Monogamy is consistent with the Christian ethical norm of *agape* as equal regard.

The Judeo-Christian notion of prophetic ethics involves three principles, says Post. The first principle is that we are to give greater protection to the most vulnerable. The second is that fidelity in marriage ensures for all children the benefit of having both a caring mother and a caring father. And third, women must be treated with equal regard within a marriage covenant.

Post examines marriage and family as understood in the teachings of Jesus. He concludes that Jesus endorsed one’s love of parents, spouses, children and friends -- although this endorsement is relativized under crisis conditions. Jesus was critical of the family only when the family became an obstacle to His salvific mission.

The family is strengthened by participation within the community of the church. *Agape*, argues Post, “must be fully appreciated as providing a strong moral underpinning for family life and therefore is providing a powerful locus that should inform the spiritual and moral tone of the Christian family” (66). While the Christian tradition is complex, somewhat contested, and pluralistic, it holds that those who marry are bound by God and the common good to intend and to realize stability for the future of children and society.

More attention has recently been paid to homosexuality, abortion and pre-marital and extra-marital sexual relationships than to marriage and family as community and institutions. Unfortunately, Western culture seems to esteem passion more than social stability. In response to the need to pay attention to the family, Post constructs a

contemporary theology of the family. He argues that marriage should be seen as a covenant rather than a contract, in so far as a contract implies that one serves the love of the self and not the mutual love of both partners. “A socially responsive Christianity,” claims Post, “must construct a new ethics of marriage and family that, informed by equality between men and women, thinks deeply about what spouses owe each other, their children and outsiders near and far” (113). While love is manifested in solicitude for the welfare of the self and the other, ultimately this love is sustained by the conviction that a caring, parental God exists at the center of the universe. It is wrong, declares Post, “for any Christian to think that formlessness in marriage and family is perfectly reasonable or theologically sound” (2).

Post breaks new ground in offering theological reflection in the context of society’s understanding and practice of adoption. Christian ethics support the bonding and covenant love of adoptive families. While affirming the evolutionary argument that creatures have a biological investment as parents to continue their genealogy, Post suggests that Christian ethics suppose that the ties of nature are important but not absolute. “Christian community legitimizes families created purely by *agape* rather than begotten biologically” (133). When birth parents simply cannot raise a child, the child’s best interests, coupled with an appreciation of the circumstances of the parents, require recourse to adoption. The relinquishment of a child by a woman who cannot care for it can be an expression of *agape*. Post concludes his chapter on adoption by arguing that Christianity needs to create a pedagogy for all oppressed adopted persons. This pedagogy would include liberation from social stereotypes that such adopted persons internalize and even sometimes self-impose.

In examining the contemporary challenge of giving care to those who suffer from severe disabling conditions, Post notes that honoring the commandment to honor thy father and thy mother requires more of us now than it did when parents died much younger. Today’s society sees that the fastest growing segment of the population is the elderly. Post claims that it is possible for people with progressive dementia to experience emotional, relational, esthetic, and spiritual well-being.

The final chapter of *More Lasting Unions* addresses the tension between love for family members and love for all of humanity. While *agape* includes love even for enemies, persons have a natural inclination to love the near and dear. Christianity points toward a love of neighbor in a manner consistent with impartiality, but there also must be some rough ordering of love to allow for special considerations with respect to the family. There is no simple formula, says Post, for discerning to what measure one loves the near and dear as opposed to the stranger. A theory of justice that fails to strike a reasoned balance between the family and the common good, however, is an inadequate theory. Post concludes that “the challenge facing the family is to nurture familial bonds in loyalty while simultaneously caring for the neediest neighbors” (196).

Ramsey, Paul. *Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control*. Yale University Press, 1970.

Sanderlin, David. "Charity According to St. John of the Cross." *Journal of Religious Ethics*. 21.1 (Spring 1993): 87-115.

The essay introduces the instruction on love of Saint John of the Cross. The author insists that Saint John of the Cross's belief is that love is pure, self-denying, disinterested Christian love. Furthermore, this love is not restricted to deity; it is possible for humans to love in this way. "We should love our neighbors disinterestedly for the sake of God alone, without attaching ourselves to them as a source of our happiness" (95).

Santurri, Edmund, N. and William Werpehowski, eds. *The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992.

Spohn, William. *Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics*. New York: Continuum, 2000.

The author writes from a Roman Catholic Christian perspective and argues that adequate Christian ethics must place the words and actions of Jesus at its center. Spohn believes that Christianity confesses Jesus Christ to be the definitive but not exclusive revelation of God. "Morally, this confession means that Jesus Christ plays a normative role in Christians' moral reflection. His story enables us to recognize *which* features of experience are significant, guides *how* we act, and forms *who* we are in the community of faith" (2).

The first three chapters make the case for the sources and method that the author employs. The argument is that three particular sources shape Christian ethics: the New Testament, virtue ethics, and spirituality. The second half of the book addresses how one perceives God's reign and Jesus' compassion vision, as well as exploring the emotions and dispositions of the Christian life. When explaining the importance of compassion in the ethical vision introduced by Jesus, the author writes, "Luke's parable of the Good Samaritan shows that compassion is the optic nerve of the Christian vision" (87). The author concludes that the Christian moral life is grounded in the person of Jesus, and this grounding is demonstrated through the regular Christian practices that shape the lives of committed believers.

Vacek, Edward Collins. *Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994.

Although this text was written fairly recently, it is fast becoming a classic work on love, one which those who wrestle with theologies of love must take seriously. Vacek is a Roman Catholic, but his hypotheses and conclusions are not characteristic of most Catholic thought. The author is well-read and the topics covered are vast. “The central idea of this book is quite simple: (1) God loves us; (2) we love God; (3) we and God form a community; (4) we and God cooperate” (xv).

Vacek’s main contention is that the love of God must be the center of Christian life and theology. To offer such a theology of love, Vacek undertakes a phenomenological orientation, which pays close attention to human experience. In particular, the author admits that Christian experience is privileged.

One reason this text offers such a rich resource to those in the love-and-science dialogue is that the author examines closely the three dominate forms of love: *agape*, *eros*, and *philia*. Vacek argues that Christians are mistaken to claim that *agape* is the Christian love. Rather, contends the author, *philia* represents the most complete Christian love; *philia* “holds pride of place among Christian loves” (xvi). In fact, Vacek claims that “the central thesis of [my] book . . . is that communion or *philia* is the foundation and goal of Christian life” (280).

Chapter one argues that a love relation with God implies a distinctively Christian moral life. This moral life entails certain emotions and values or what Vacek calls “orthokardia”: “The ordered affections that unite us with God, ourselves, other people, and the world” (5). It is the Christian’s relation with God that makes the Christian life distinctive.

The second chapter addresses the nature of love, and he notes that “most philosophical and theological writing, when it speaks of ‘love,’ does not analyze what love is, but rather assumes it has an evident meaning” (34). Avoiding this mistake, Vacek defines love as “*an affective, affirming participation in the goodness of a being (or Being)*”. Woven into this description are two strands. Any theory of love has to account for our experience of wanting to be with or have those we love, and delighting when we do so. Love unites. A theory of love also must account for our experiences of wanting for the beloved” (34 [italics in the original]). He further defines love as an emotional, affirming participation in the dynamic tendency of an object to realize its fullness.

The doctrine of God that Vacek envisions includes a God who is truly related to creation. The author describes the God–world relation as “love-as-participation” (95). This means that while God is free to create; God is also bound to that which is created.

God’s identity is united, but not wholly so, with history. Humans have

autonomy vis-à-vis God, but their freedom depends upon deity. Vacek suggests that creaturely cooperation with the activity of God is required for the full expression of love in the world.

When addressing the extent and duration of love that should be expressed by lovers, Vacek argues that “love tries to enhance the well-being of the beloved, and it does so not only in the short term and for this or that person but in the long run for as many persons” (182). However, “because God loves not only us but others and also all of creation, we cannot . . . conclude that what God is doing in the world will always be entirely for our good. Some loss to our own well-being will be necessary” (188).

In chapters five through nine, Vacek addresses issues typically subsumed under an exploration of three kinds of love: *agape*, *eros*, and *philia*. He claims that we may love the beloved for the sake of the beloved, for our own sake, or for the sake of the relationship we have with the beloved. He calls these love relations “*agape*, *eros*, and *philia*,” which means that he distinguishes each by his phrase “for the sake of.” In his chapter, “*Agape*,” Vacek gives insightful critiques of the work of both Anders Nygren and Gene Outka. He argues that *agape* “is centered on the beloved’s value and is directed toward the enhancement of that value. It is a faithful love that is spontaneous, generous, and willing to sacrifice” (191). In later chapters, Vacek also argues for a positive theological case for self-love.

In the final two chapters, Vacek addresses issues related to friendship love. Although his approach to Christian love is a pluralist one in that he affirms the value of both *eros* and *agape*, Vacek notes in these chapters his central thesis that “communion or *philia* is the foundation and goal of the Christian life” (280). By *philia*, he “means affectively affirming members of a community for the sake of the communally shared life” (287-88). It is this friendship love that constitutes a mutual relationship with God. “*Philia* creates, expresses, and enhances a mutual relationship. *philia* fulfills us, but that fulfillment is not its primary consideration” (311). Vacek argues that theological focus on *agape* or *eros* without *philia* tends to promote individualism.

While duties to strangers are important for the Christian, they are not the paradigm for Christian living. Instead, Christians begin with the special relationships that they have with those who are near and dear, especially with God. “This book arises the convictions that God relates to us in special relationships, that human selfhood begins in such relations, particularly in the family, and that the fullness of human personhood is possible only through deep *philia* relationships” (312).

Will, James E. *The Universal God: Justice, Love, and Peace in the Global Village*. Kentucky: John Knox Press, 1994.

Williams, Preston. "An Analysis of the Conception of Love and Its Influence on Justice in the Thought of Martin Luther King, Jr." *Journal of Religious Ethics*. 18 (Fall 1990): 15-31.

Wyschogrod, Edith. *Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy*. University of Chicago Press, 1990.

The author's basic argument is that ethics in a postmodern age must not look to normative structures of moral theories; ethics must look instead to the lives of saints as a basis for understanding how to live. What marks the saint as the model for ethics is the fact that saints recognize the primacy of the other person and dissolve any self-interest that they might have. This means that ethics is "the sphere of transaction between 'the self' and 'Other'" (xv). The ethics of saints emerge in their life habits.

Wyschogrod argues that saints exhibit a particular altruism. This altruism is reflective, and negation and ambiguity mark saintliness. Saints who are altruistic reject any self-empowerment in their total regard for the other. This means that the Other is not only different from the one acting but also carries the moral weight. The Other's needs include the needs of his or her material body.

Saints should not be imagined as emanating from some specific religious community. Rather, saints are found across a broad spectrum of belief systems and institutional practices. "A saintly life is defined as one in which compassion for the other, irrespective of cost to the saint, is the primary trait" (xxiii).

Wyschogrod does not find dominant and traditional moral theories to provide adequate bases for ethics. Most moral theories treat the Other as another kind of self. Most moral theorists begin understanding altruism with the action of the self. Wyschogrod advocates understanding altruism by beginning with the Other as its starting point. In short, Wyschogrod argues that a theoretical ethic must be supplanted by an ethic grounded in narrative and hagiography. She argues from the standpoint of phenomenological and postmodern thinkers such as Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida, Bataille, and Blanshot.

3. PRIMARILY PHILOSOPHICAL:

Adams, Robert Merrihew. *Finite and Infinite Goods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Metaphysician and moral philosopher, Robert Merrihew Adams, offers an elaborate framework for ethics based upon divine love as the ultimate good. Adams understands God as the Good itself, which means that the Good is a concrete personal individual. In Adams' metaphysics, God plays the part of the form of the beautiful in Plato's thought. God as the supreme Good transcends all other goods.

Adams believes that God's existence is metaphysically necessary, and those properties that fit God follow necessarily from the divine nature. The supreme Good is one aspect of the divine nature. This means that the only limits upon God are those that follow from God's own nature. Love is a necessary aspect of the divine nature, but God's preferences and actions as expressions of love are contingent. "The freedom ascribed to God does not include, as ours does, a possibility of desiring or choosing those ends that are rightly counted as bad" (48). This means that the standard of goodness is defined by the divine nature and thus is good for all possible worlds.

According to Adams' theory, what counts as good is not reducible to any human view about what the good is. The good is not fully accountable by any empirical test. Rather, the realm of value is organized around a transcendent good that is God. This means that the nature of value cannot be confined to the horizon of the physical or human world.

Adams makes a distinction between well-being and excellence. He notes that most contemporary thought focuses mainly upon well-being, or what is good for a person. Adams' own theory places primary importance upon excellence. Excellence implies a goodness in itself rather than goodness for another. Interest in well-being is secondary to the greater interest in excellence. What is good for a person is the living of a life characterized by the enjoyment of that which is excellent.

In the second segment of the book, Adams addresses what it means for individuals to love the good. The appropriate ethical relation is to be for the good, which entails loving it. God expresses *eros* in that God loves the good. Instead of understanding divine love as pure benevolence, Adams entertains seriously the notion that God desires relationship with creatures. This non-instrumental interest in relationships and excellences is part of what it means for both God and creatures to love. Adams considers what divine grace entails, arguing that it is a fundamental aspect of divine love. "Grace is love that is not completely explained by the excellence of its object" (151). While Adams claims that it would be absurd to suppose that all love excludes instrumental interest in the beloved, he also claims that love requires an interest in the beloved that is not merely instrumental. "Even divine love would be the richer rather than the poorer for finding value in the beloved" (165). Ideal love finds its reasons in the non-comparative appreciation of an object. This means that God's love is directed to things that are good, but it is not dominated by caring about whether these things are the best. Adams concludes this section with chapters on devotion, idolatry, and

the value symbols.

Adams labels the third part of the book, “The Good and the Right.” According to him, the good provides a proper framework for thinking about what is right and not the other way around. What is good has a fundamentally social aspect. Adams incorporates his theistic vision in chapter eleven by arguing that it is only the commands of a definitively good God that are candidates for defining what is human moral obligation. A main advantage of divine command theory of the nature of moral obligation, argues Adams, is that it satisfies the demand for objective moral requirements. There are a range of possibilities for how these commands are communicated or revealed by God. These possibilities may include scriptural texts, utterances of prophets, requirements of human communities, individual intuitions, etc. Signs that occur in time and place note these commands.

After examining the story of Abraham and Isaac, Adams concludes “that in any cultural context in which it is possible to worry about Abraham’s Dilemma, it will hardly be credible that a good God has commanded the sort of sacrifice that is envisaged here” (290). “I think it is the part of religious as well as moral wisdom to dismiss all thoughts of our actually being commanded by God to practice something as horrible as human sacrifice. The question whether God commands such a thing should stay off our epistemological agenda as long as it possibly can, which I expect will be forever” (291).

The question of love and obligation leads to an inquiry into vocation. Adams defines vocation as “a call from God, a command, or perhaps an invitation addressed to a particular individual, to act and live in a certain way” (301). Direct and unambiguous commands from God are extremely rare, argues Adams, which means that conflicting values and obligations in any situation need to be thought about critically before interpreting these as communicating a divine command. The concept of vocation helps to solve the issue of whether or not creatures can love all other creatures. A divine call to love some persons and some kind of goods provides a way of understanding one’s vocation. These questions of vocation lead naturally to the concluding part of Adams’ book, which address the epistemology of value.

Arendt, Hannah. *Love and Saint Augustine*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Brown, Robert. *Analyzing Love*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Goicoechea, David, ed. *The Nature and Pursuit of Love: The Philosophy of Irving Singer*. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1995.

This volume is a collection of twenty exploratory and critical essays concerning the philosophy of love propounded by Irving Singer. Singer is one of the greatest latter 20th century philosophers on romantic love. His distinctive contribution is his contention that love should be understood as bestowal. This notion of love overcomes what Singer believes are deficiencies in Anders Nygren's notion of *agape*.

The book begins with two interviews on Singer by Robert Fulford. The printed transcripts give the reader an insider's view to the various topics that Singer addresses in his life's work. At the conclusion of the edited text, Singer offers his reply to the volume's essays, which are written by critics and friendly commentators. Most of the essays in the text were originally delivered in a three day colloquium. They reflect Singer's broad interests while focusing on his key distinction between love as appraisal and bestowal as elements in the definition of love.

Hartshorne, Charles. *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.

Hartshorne, Charles. *Man's Vision of God: and the Logic of Theism*. New York: Willett, Clark & Company, 1941.

One of the 20th century's greatest philosophers offers a rational and empirical defense for the existence of God based upon reason and love. The ground for the book is "a conviction that a magnificent intellectual content is implicit in the religious faith most briefly expressed into three words, 'God is love,' which words I sincerely believe are contradicted as truly as they are embodied in the best known of the older theologies, as they certainly have been misunderstood by atheists and skeptics" (ix).

Hartshorne offers a solution to the problem of evil that is based upon a notion of divine power that is in harmony with creaturely power. "In their ultimate individuality things can only be influenced, they cannot be surely coerced" (xvi). Hartshorne's understanding of God as both absolute and relative provides a fundamental thesis for process theology's doctrine of God. In some respects, God is unchanging; in some respects, God changes. Because God is unchanging love, God's experiencing of love and gift of love must change in moment by moment existence.

Hartshorne's understanding of love plays a pivotal role in the development of the book's themes. H argues that "love is the desire for the good of others, ideally all others" (14). Divine love includes social awareness and action from that awareness. It includes both selfish and unselfish acts by God. "In God there is a perfect agreement between altruism and egoism" (161). He argues that theologians went through many

contortions to show that God's love both was love and nothing of the kind. "They sought to maintain a distinction between love as desire, with an element of possible gain or loss to the self, and love as purely altruistic benevolence; or again between sensuous and spiritual love, *eros* and *agape*. But benevolence is a form of desire" (116).

"The whole idea of religion," says Hartshorne, "is that we can know God as He is in Himself, though vaguely, for we know Him through love. We know ourselves and everything else in relation to a dim but direct sense of God's love. Love of God is the norm of creaturely love; for religion, all other human love is deficient" (127). In words sound poetic but that Hartshorne takes seriously, he writes, "the divine as love is the only theme adequate to the cosmic symphony" (216).

Hazo, Robert G. *The Idea of Love*. New York: Praeger, 1967.

A philosopher offers a philosophical analysis of the love suppositions of numerous major theologians, psychologists, and philosophers of the Western world. The purpose of the book is to discover what unites and divides thinkers of the past and present who have written about human love in particular. "We are concerned, primarily, with determining what any given author's core conception of love among human beings is, and only secondarily shall we deal with the additional characteristics, traits, or properties he may employ to distinguish the various loves with which he is concerned" (7).

The book is broken into two basic parts. The first discusses critical notions and controversies about human love as understood by the various authors. Hazo argues that all of the literature on love examined reveals that love is understood as either tendential or judgmental. By tendential, Hazo refers to feelings, emotions or desires that imply that love is not an act of thought or attitude of mind. By judgmental, the author refers to love as a matter of cognition whereby the lover admires, respects, or values the object of love. Tendential love is further subdivided into acquisitive and benevolent desire. Judgmental love is divided into two types, esteem and valuation. Esteem signifies a person's judgment that someone is good in his or her self. Valuation has to do with a person's judgment that someone is good for the one judging. Hazo notes that most of his authors place love entirely within the sphere of tendency. Those who include an element of cognition differ on their belief about whether cognition comes prior to, along with, or following tendential love.

After disclosing the various types of love that emerges from a study of dominant literature on love, the author explores various controversies about natural human love. Hazo claims that whether love is tendential or judgmental, there are various minimum agreements among the authors as to what love is. First, the respect in which a lover loves the beloved is the respect in which the lover is interested in the beloved. Second, love always involves some preference. Third, love points toward action. Fourth, all

authors speak of love as either good in itself or as pointing toward some good. These characteristics form what Hazo believes is the nucleus of the idea of love.

The second chapter includes discussions of more than twenty-five questions about what love is. The questions that Hazo proposes expose the controversies in the literature about the nature and types of natural human love.

After examining controversies about natural human love, Hazo turns to controversies in the literature about supernatural human love. All authors examined in this segment believe that a supernatural realm exists and that the religious experience of love by humans is impossible without supernatural aid. The intent is not to examine the nature of divine love but only to deal with God's love to the extent that one must to make intelligible the particular author's conception of how God inspires or instigates love in humans.

Hazo begins with a general note that there seems to be an important difference in the general conceptions of love held by Roman Catholics and Protestants. He believes that the dispute about the character and relationship of *eros* and *agape* within the Christian tradition is at the very core of how one understands supernatural human love. He notes that "with some qualifications, all agree that God's love for man is purely benevolent, since God is, by definition, perfect and in need of nothing" (101). The authors addressed in this chapter include Augustine, Aquinas, Fenelon, Bernard of Clairvaux, Anders Nygren, Soren Kierkegaard, Denis DeRougemont, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and C. S. Lewis.

Hazo concludes from the literature that the controversy of supernatural human love focuses on the question of self-interestedness versus disinterestedness. He also notes that the differences between the question of self-interest in relation to supernatural human love is directly related to how one understands the effects of original sin. This leads him to conclude that "the idea of love or, rather, human love, is less fundamental than the idea of man" (160).

The fourth chapter addresses the unity and diversity amongst literatures and amongst authors proposing theories of natural and supernatural human love. Hazo is especially impressed by the similarities of characteristics between natural love and supernatural human love. Among those similarities are (1) the agreement that love is a constructive, unifying, or good thing, (2) that love is a key to human happiness, (3) love is primarily a relational concept, one in which the notions of self and other are pivotal.

The remaining chapters of the book provide documentation and analysis of the specific views of specific authors as they relate to love. Those authors discussed include the following: Plato, Augustine, Aristotle, Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Leone Ebreo Castiglione, Bernard of Clairvaux, Soren Kierkegaard, Kant, Scheler, Pitirim Sorokin, Freud, Karl Menninger, Jung, William James, Plotinus, Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Pietro Bembo, Ibsen, Andreas Capellanus, Stendahl, Shopenhauer, DeRougemont, Santayana, Darwin, Rousseau, Spinoza, Leibniz, Adam Smith, Hegel, Simmel, Nicolai Hartmann, C. S. Lewis, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Theodor Reik, Erich Fromm, Descartes, Hume, Locke, Vladimir Solovyev, and Pascal.

Martin, Mike W. *Love's Virtues*. Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1996.

(See annotation in "2. Emphasis Upon Ethics" section.)

Norton, David L. and Mary F. Kille. Eds. *Philosophies of Love*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971.

This tome provides a wide variety of readings on love and philosophy. The editors believe that love is a profound measure of human life, and a person's philosophy of love permeates his or her philosophy of life. The text includes more than forty contributions, most of them classic essays with regard to love. "Developing a philosophy of life is not something we can relegate to others to do for us, like house building or plumbing repair, but something each of us must do for himself. There is no escaping it, each of us is required to be something of a philosopher" (1).

The editors divide the book into six parts. Part one, titled "Romantic Love: Madness of a Normal Man," has eight readings on romantic love. The second part includes ten essays on *eros*. This section is titled, "*Eros*: Love As Aspiration toward the Ideal." Part three addresses *agape* love and is titled "*Agape*: The Divine Bestowal." The editors title the fourth section of the book "Tristanism and Chivalric Love." Part five deals with friendship love: "Friendship: 'Because It Was He, Because It Was I.'" The final section of the book is on love involving fellow feeling: "Fellow Feeling: Universal Bond of Humankind."

Nussbaum, Martha. *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Nussbaum, Martha. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Philosopher Nussbaum argues in this book, the product of her Gifford Lectures, that emotions shape who we are, and they must form part of a system of ethical reasoning as intelligent responses to the perception of value. Emotions include in their content judgments that can be true or false and good or bad guides the ethical choice. "A central part of developing an

adequate ethical theory,” claims Nussbaum, “will be to develop an adequate theory of the emotions, including their cultural sources, their history in infancy and childhood, and their sometimes unpredictable and disorderly operation in the daily life of human beings who are attached to things outside themselves” (2). Emotions have a complicated cognitive structure in relation to objects that we cherish and this relationship extends over time. And this means that without emotional development, a part of our reasoning capacity’s political creatures will be missing.

Nussbaum’s Neo-Stoic inspired project is to construct an analytic framework for thinking about emotions in general. Emotions “involve judgment about important things, judgments in which, appraising external objects are salient for our own well being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully control” (19).

In her first chapter, “Emotions as Judgments of Value,” Nussbaum sets out the basis for her argument about the intelligence of emotions. Emotions view the world from the perspective of one’s own scheme of goals, the things to which one attaches value for what it means to live well. In short, emotions are valuative appraisals of the world.

Continuity exists between humans and non-humans in that both display emotions. Studies of animal emotions underscore Nussbaum’s claim that cognitive appraisals need not all be objects of reflexive self-consciousness. Although all individuals feel emotions, both human and non-human, this does not mean that individual histories and social norms do not shape emotions. In fact, they do. A path should be steered between those at one extreme who argue that emotions are totally constructed by society and those at the other extreme who argue that society plays no role in the shaping of emotions.

Emotions “bear the traces of a history that is at once commonly human, socially constructed, and idiosyncratic” (177). This means that adult human emotions cannot be understood without understanding their history in infancy and childhood. Nussbaum rejects theories calling individuals to bring every emotion into line with the dictates of reason, or the dictates of one’s ideals, whatever they may be.

In the second part of this 700 page book, Nussbaum focuses upon the emotion of compassion. She defines compassion as “a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune” (301). Compassion includes cognitive aspects, including (1) the belief or appraisal that the suffering one encounters is serious rather than trivial, (2) the belief that the person does not deserve the suffering, and (3) the belief that the possibilities of the person who experiences the emotion are similar to those of the sufferer.

Compassion involves a significant quasi-ethical achievement in that it values another person as part of one’s own circle of concern. One should not depend upon the vicissitudes of personal emotion, but should build emotion’s insights into the structures of ethical rules and institutions. Furthermore, the relationships between compassion and social institutions is that compassionate individuals construct institutions that embody what they imagine and institutions influence the development of compassion in individuals.

In the third part of the book, Nussbaum addresses various traditions of erotic love. She does so hoping to show that erotic love can be part of morally acceptable life. Erotic love

“involves an opening of the self toward an object, a conception of the self that pictures the self as incomplete and reaching out for something valued” (460). This means that erotic love is based on unequal concern not explained by reason alone. It is love that is partial.

The literature that Nussbaum explores in section three is part of the ascent tradition of love in that the authors who write of this love offer ways to reform or educate erotic love “so as to keep its creative force while purifying it of ambivalence and excess, and making it more friendly to general social aims” (469). The authors that Nussbaum addresses in the final part of the book include Plato, Spinoza, Proust, Augustine, Dante, Emily Bronte, Mahler, Walt Whitman, and James Joyce. This literature presents (1) a tradition that sees *eros* love as fundamentally the contemplation of the good and beautiful, (2) Christian account of the ascent that investigates the role of humility, longing and grace, (3) a romantic account that strives for love’s transcendence, and (4) the reverse ascent or the descent of love in which human desire sets out its task of embracing the imperfect human world with love.

The Neo-Stoic theory of emotions that Nussbaum develops entails that while love is an emotion, it is also a relationship. Given this, Nussbaum critiques the authors’ writings in the third section of her book using three normative criteria. The first criteria is compassion by which she asks, “Does this view of love y the constituent features of compassion, including the seriousness of various human predicaments, one’s responsibility for these predicaments, and the proper extent of concern.” The second criteria is reciprocity. By reciprocity Nussbaum means the idea that relationships of concern are established in which people treat one another as agents and ends, not as things. The third criteria, individuality, means that love recognizes that human beings are separate and qualitatively distinct individuals.

Oord, Thomas Jay. *Agape*, “Altruism, and Well-Being: Full-Orbed Love for the Science and Religion Dialogue.” *Contemporary Philosophy: Philosophic Research, Analysis and Resolution*. 25 (2002).

Oord sketches definitions and uses of love and altruism offered by prominent theological (Nygren, Outka, Pope, Post) and scientific (Wilson, Hamilton, Trivers, Sober and Wilson) voices. He argues that *agape* and altruistic loves are necessary, but not sufficient, aspects of love. Oord argues for the greater overall adequacy of what he calls “full-orbed love,” which includes *agape*, *eros*, *philia*, altruism, and egoism. It is this notion of full-orbed love that should be the focus of the science and religion dialogue.

Radcliffe, Dana. “Compassion and Commanded Love.” *Faith and Philosophy*. 11.2 (1994): 50-71.

The essay contrasts love as a commandment requiring obedience and love as a compassionate response. Radcliffe argues that the primary Kantian notion of love relies upon action from the will rather than emotions. It is commanded, not compassionate, love. Unlike his followers, however, Kant did have a place for the emotions as evidenced in his writings.

Radcliffe argues that one has a duty to cultivate the dispositions and emotions required for compassion. This involves training so that one will feel compassionate when a situation arises requiring compassion. “Possessing the virtue of *agape* includes being disposed to feel compassion for others in distress and to be motivated by it to help. Further evidence that the Love Commandment prescribes empathetic feeling is the fact that the Synoptic Gospels often portray Jesus himself as moved to feel loving compassion toward people in need” (50).

Singer, Irving. *The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther*. Vol. 1. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, 1984; *The Nature of Love: Courtly and Romantic*. Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; *The Nature of Love: The Modern World*. Vol. 3. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

In this monumental, three-volume work, Irving Singer explores vast expressions and theories of love from ancient times to the present. His intent is not to present his own philosophy of love; rather, the author attempts to be investigative in his approach. The first volume, *Plato to Luther*, traces the ideas of love from ancient times up through the middle ages. In addition to his study of Judeo-Christian love, Singer addresses love in the works of Plotinus, Aristotle, and Plato.

In his introductory essays of volume one, Singer analyzes love as both an ideal and a psychological state. It is in this volume that Singer uses the words “appraisal” and “bestowal” to delineate two different kinds of love. Singer believes love involves a way of valuing in that what one finds valuable in the other one embraces. But love also creates value in the other. The history of love in the western world is a history of new ways of bestowing and acquiring values.

Singer argues that the Bible and Greek philosophy are the two sources from which the dominant philosophies of love stem. He also contends that “what distinguishes Christianity, what gives it a unique place in man’s intellectual life, is the fact that it alone has made love the dominant principle in all areas of dogma. Whatever Christians may have done to others or themselves, theirs is the only faith in which God and love are the same” (159).

Singer believes that it is the ideas of love that have developed throughout history that have inspired love. This is a philosophical work in the phenomenological tradition. Singer’s works are instructive resources for those wanting to address the wide history of love.

Singer, Irving. *The Pursuit of Love*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Soble, Alan. *Eros, Agape, and Philia*. New York: Paragon, 1989.

Soble provides this collection of primary writings dealing with the subject of love as a companion volume to an earlier volume of readings on the philosophy of sex. He does so believing that love is “such a rich phenomenon provoking questions in ontology, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, theology and philosophy of religion, and that to restrict the investigation of its many forms and dimensions to the ties between love and sexuality is to commit a painful, conceptual truncation” (ix). The contents of the book are broken into four main sections: “Where We Are;” “Classical Sources;” “Exploring the Classics;” and a contemporary analysis of love. Throughout the book, Soble often relates the word “love” to its various romantic implications.

Soble’s method in putting the book together is to provide three or four primary writings prefaced by a summary of the reason these writings are important. He introduces the entire book, however, by asking, “What is love?” “The complexity of this question – compare it to, What is a chair? – is reflected in the fact that so many different answers to it exist and debates about the nature of genuine love seem impossible to resolve” (xix). Love can be compared to art, for each is equally a difficult domain to describe.

One of the reasons love is so difficult to explain is that the word refers to many different things. Often, however, the attempt to conceptualize love is framed with regard to the Greek love words – *eros*, *philia*, and *agape*. Soble believes that the general characterization of ‘*eros*-style’ love arises in this way: x loves y because y has attractive or valuable qualities. ‘*Agape*-style’ love is understood as x loving y independently of y’s merit. This book offers original formulations of the theories of *eros*, *agape* and *phileo* and then attempts to explain more generally what these love types might mean for contemporary thinking.

Soble, Alan. *The Structure of Love*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

Solomon, Robert C. *Love: Emotion, Myth, and Metaphor*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1981.

Solomon attempts to construct a philosophical set of arguments for a contemporary conception of romantic love. He attacks what he believes are nonsensical, common expressions and notions of love that have been perpetrated in praise of love as an emotion. The author looks at empirical evidence and tangible facts of collective experience to separate wishful thinking about love from the nature of experiencing love itself.

Solomon writes in a very entertaining way using expressions and metaphors, literature and common experiences of life. Topics addressed include emotions, feelings, *eros*, feminism, fantasies, illusions, commitments, honesty, intimacy, sex, and self-esteem. The author defines love essentially as an emotion that is surrounded by myths and metaphors motivated by hopes and desires.

Solomon, Robert C. and Kathleen M. Higgins. Eds. *The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love*. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

This volume is one of the very best for its presentation of the wide varieties of writings about erotic love. The text is divided into four parts. The first includes classic writings on erotic love from authors living prior to the 20th century. Included among the authors are: Plato, Sappho, Theano, Ovid, Augustine, Heloise and Abelard, Andreas Capellanus, Shakespeare, John Milton, Spinoza, Rousseau, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Stendahl, and Nietzsche.

The second part of the book includes classic writings on love from those in the 20th century. Included here are the writings of Freud, Jung, Karen Horney, Rainer Maria Rilke, Emma Goldman, Denis de Rougemont, D. H. Lawrence, Sartre, Simon de Beauvoir, Philip Slater, and Shulamith Firestone.

The third section of the book offers contemporary essays that advance theories and notions proposed by authors of antiquity. Writers included in this part are the following: Irving Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Jerome Neu, Louis Mackey, Emelie Rorty, Elizabeth Rappaport, Kathryn Pauly Morgan.

The fourth part of the book includes essays that are more theoretical, including a number of new attempts to define and understand love. Authors in this section include Robert Nozick, Annette Baier, William Gass, Laurence Thomas, Ronald de Sousa, Robert C. Solomon.

Taylor, Charles. *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*. Harvard University Press, 1992.

The author offers a grand-scale history of modern, Western identity. By

“identity” the author means the ensemble of understandings of what it means to be a human agent, including the sense of inwardness, freedom, individuality and being imbedded in nature. The text is a largely historical piece intended to allow the reader to grasp the richness and complexity of the modern understanding of the self as it developed out of earlier pictures of human identity.

In his preface, the author sums up his approach. “I focus on three major facets of this identity: firsts, modern inwardness, the sense of ourselves as beings with inner depths, and the connected notions that we are ‘selves’; second, the affirmation of ordinary life which develops from the early modern period; third, the expressivist notion of nature as an inner moral source” (x).

Taylor concludes that the modern identity of humans is richer in its moral sources than many contemporary skeptics suppose. Disengaged in instrumental modes of thought and action have steadily increased their hold on modern life, argues the author. One important insight in this book, *Sources of the Self*, is that modern subjectivity has its roots in ideas about what is the human good.

Taylor, Richard. *With Heart and Mind: A Philosopher Looks at Nature, Love, and Death*. New York: St. Martin’s, 1973.

Wagoner, Robert E. *The Meanings of Love: An Introduction to Philosophy of Love*. London: Praeger, 1997.

Wilson, John. *Love Between Equals: A Philosophical Study of Love and Sexual Relationships*. New York: St. Martin’s, 1995.

Wyschogrod, Edith. *Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy*. University of Chicago Press, 1990.

(See annotation in “2. Emphasis Upon Ethics” section.)

4. PRIMARILY RELIGIOUS:

***Buddhist**

Dalai Lama. *An Open Heart: Practicing Compassion in Everyday Life*. Nicholas Vreeland, ed. Little Brown and Company, 2001.

Material for the book is derived from the Dalai Lama's 1999 address in Central Park, New York. The Dalai Lama speaks insightfully about how one might live a better life. The book provides a variety of specific practices and techniques that can engender happiness.

Spiritual practice is a matter of taming unwanted emotions, which means becoming aware of how the mind works. Humans can develop through time helpful states of mind while eliminating harmful states. By doing this, we will cultivate compassion for others and happiness for ourselves. Following traditional Buddhist method, the Dalai Lama points to the causes of suffering and then reflects upon how this suffering can be overcome.

Davidson, Richard J. and Anne Harrington, eds., *Visions of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhists Examine Human Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Essayists examine aspects of Tibetan Buddhism as they relate to the views of Western behavioral science. While Western science has typically held a neutral or negative view of human nature, Tibetan Buddhism celebrates the positive human potential for compassion. *Visions of Compassion* is an extraordinary cross-cultural dialogue about human nature and its relation to the non-human world.

Structurally, the book is organized into two parts. The first draws upon Buddhist studies, anthropology, and the history of science to focus on cultural, historical, and metalinguistic challenges. The second part moves the reader to address some of the best of what Western bio-behavioral and social scientific tradition has to say about altruism, ethics, empathy, and compassion. One of the more interesting aspects of the volume is the conversations printed from the transcripts of the actual conference exchanges between the scientists and monks in Dharamsala.

In Buddhism, the coming to know of reality is associated with an expansive sense of liberation, a feeling of connectedness to cosmic and living processes. However, modern scientific scholars often feel alienated from the reality that they seek to understand. One essayist, Anne Harrington, suggests that perhaps the Western alienation from nature is partly a result of a secularized Judeo-Christian world that still believes in evil but has lost its faith in God. Philosopher-scientist, Elliott Sober,

proposes that the ability to feel extended compassion beyond one's group is correlated with the ability to feel compassion with one's close relatives. In other words, "individuals well-attuned to the suffering of those near and dear have circles of compassion that potentially extend quite far afield" (63). In his own inspiring essay, the Dalai Lama argues that "with a will to change, confidence in our own positive potential, and a basic outlook on life that respects the profound interdependence of all things, we *can* and *must* secure a firm grounding for fundamental ethical principles" (80).

***Comparative**

Mohler, James A. *Dimensions of Love: East and West*. New York: Doubleday, 1975.

Templeton, John. *Agape Love: A Tradition Found in Eight World Religions*. Philadelphia & London: Templeton Foundation Press, 1999.

Templeton argues that *agape* love is not exclusive to any one religion, but it is an underlying principle in all major world religions. He defines *agape* love as unlimited, pure, and unconditional as well as altruistic.

Agape love expresses a unity of purpose that is common to all people. It holds within it the opportunity to transcend differences of religious beliefs and to live in joy and peace. *Agape* involves feeling and expressing pure, unlimited love for every human being, with no exception.

Templeton notes that all religions are not the same; and it is also not his goal to convert persons from one religion to another. "Rather, the purpose is to point toward the possibilities and responsibilities of love. It is to awaken people to the realization that despite the differences, all religions share some very important, fundamental principles and goals, the highest of which is the realization of *agape* love -- unconditional, unlimited, pure love" (5).

The eight religious traditions explored are Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Native American Spirituality. The author concludes with these words: "The option to grow in *agape* is open to everyone on earth. It is an invitation to true happiness for you and others. May it become our aspiration, our expression of God's love radiating through us" (111).

Sorokin, Pitirim. *The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation*. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation, (1954) 2002.

(See annotation in “1. Classic Love Texts” section)

***Eastern Orthodox**

Berzonsky, Vladimir. *The Gift of Love*. New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985.

The Gift of Love provides very short chapters intended to be read as devotional thoughts. The author argues that “we learn to love in stages, developing an ever greater power to become God-like in our affections, increasing our capacity to care less for self and become filled with concern for God and all He made” (9). Writing from an Orthodox Christian perspective, Berzonsky argues that ultimately love is a mystery revealed in Jesus Christ.

The book is divided into three main sections. The first is titled “From Solomon’s Song of Songs.” The second addresses New Testament notions of love and is titled “From St. Paul’s Hymn of Love in First Corinthians.” The third part of the book includes the author’s thoughts about love texts found in other places in Scripture. The author’s basic contention is that love is a gift from God that invites us and challenges us to respond with whatever capacity we have within us to love God, each other, and the creation.

Zizioulas, John D. *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church*. New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997.

***Feminist**

Andolsen, Barbara Hilkert. “Agape in Feminist Ethics.” *Journal of Religious Ethics*. 9 (1981): 69-83.

Andolsen, Barbara Hilkert, Christine E. Gudorf, and Mary D. Pellauer. Eds. *Women’s Consciousness, Women’s Conscience: A Reader in Feminist Ethics*. Minneapolis: Seabury, 1985.

Avis, Paul. *Eros and the Sacred*. Harrisburg, Penn.: Morehouse, 1990.

Avis argues for the twin concerns that (1) *eros* be understood as a morally legitimate love crucial to Christianity and (2) women ought to be afforded their equal place in Christian leadership. Although Avis notes early that by *eros* he means a philosophical concept that has to do with the profound human drive toward creativity and fulfillment, much of the book has to do with the author's understanding of female sexuality and gender as related to *eros*.

According to Avis, many contemporary feminists cannot find a spiritual home in Christianity because they experience rejection or indifference. Avis responds to this problem by looking at insights from human and social sciences and carrying out an ideological critique of biblical and traditional Christian assumptions about women and their place in the sacred realm. The dominant image of women in the Bible and the Christian tradition is, unfortunately, the product of a series of male-centered and male-dominant social systems. These social systems have distorted the Christian theological understanding of the nature of God, the person of Christ, and human well-being in relationships, community, and especially sexuality.

Because Christianity and the church should be in the business of therapy, i.e., healing humanity's deepest wounds, it has a responsibility to act in ways that inspire men and women to become whole persons. In other words, says Avis, "The Church must become the locus of transforming therapy – a therapeutic community" (71). The therapeutic community must reflect the good life inspired by love and guided by knowledge.

To argue his points, the author examines a wide variety of literature including psychology, philosophy, and theology. He specifically addresses sexuality as sacred and profane in the Christian testaments. In this literature, Avis notes both the resources for affirming *eros* and the role of women and also examples in which *eros* and women are identified as unintellectual and as weaker sexual objects. One thing the church can do today, suggests Avis, is to invite women to take their rightful place in representative ministry. It can open the publicly important realm of the sacred. It can invite women into the sanctuary where holy things are handled on behalf of God and humanity.

Avis's comments on Anders Nygren's classic, *Agape and Eros*, are engaging. He rejects Nygren's thesis that God and *eros* cannot be correlated. Avis believes that the consequences of denying *eros* in God are extremely serious. It means that *eros* in human beings has no source, analogy or hope of redemption in God; our erotic nature in itself alienates us from God. Avis argues that one cannot integrate *eros* with the sacred unless one finds a place for *eros* in the very life of God. He concludes that "a Christianity that stresses inherent dignity of human beings, even those who have suffered fearful indignities at the hands of nature or fellow humans, as the presupposition of human rights and social justice, will speak more readily of the *eros* of God at work in and through His created world" (136-137). If *eros* and *agape* are united in God, there would be no conflict in our understanding between the self-giving sacrificial love of God

and that overflowing goodness that longs to impart good to creatures.

Cooey, Paul, Farmer, Sharon and Ross, Mary Ellen eds. *Embodied Love: Sensuality and Relationship as Feminist Values*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987.

This is a classic text of essays on feminism, love, and spirituality. Its contributors make up a list of some of the most influential feminists voices in religion. Of particular note is chapter eight, "Relational Love: A Feminist Christian Vision." In this essay, author Linell E. Cady argues for themes that have come to characterize feminist view of love: mutuality, relationality, and *eros*.

The topics covered are extensive, and perhaps the best way to introduce the book is to provide chapter titles:

Embodiment, Identity, and Value

1. The Word Become Flesh: Woman's Body, Language, and Value: *Paula M. Cooey*
2. The "Quilting" of Women's History: Phoebe of Cenchreae: *Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza*
3. Reverence for Life: The Need for a Sense of Finitude: *Carol Christ*
4. Spirit and Matter, Public and Private: The Challenge of Feminism to Traditional Dualisms: *Rosemary Radford Ruether*

Embodiment, Communication, and Ethics

5. Problems with Feminist Theory: Historicity and the Search for Sure Foundations: *Sheila Greeve Davaney*
6. Female Voice, Written Word: Women and Authority in Hebrew Scripture: *Claudia V. Camp*
7. Softening the Hearts of Men: Women, Embodiment, and Persuasion in the Thirteenth Century: *Sharon A. Farmer*
8. Relational Love: A Feminist Christian Vision: *Linell E. Cady*
9. The Ethical Limitations of Autonomy: A Critique of the Moral Vision of Psychological Man: *Mary Ellen Ross*

Embodiment, Relationship, and Religious Experience

10. Negotiation Autonomy: African Women and Christianity: *Terri A. Castaneda*
11. Piety, Persuasion, and Friendship: Female Jewish Leadership in Modern Times: *Ellen M. Umansky*
12. Madonnas for a New World: Harriet Beecher Stowe's Iconography of Faith: *Patricia R. Hill*
13. Aesthetic Vision, Prophetic Voice: Intimacy and Social Justice in Kaethe Kollqitz and Dorothea Lange: *Gregor Goethals*

Farley, Wendy. *Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy*. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1990.

Heyward, Carter. "Lamenting the Loss of Love: A Response to Colin Grant." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 24.1 (Spring 1996): 23-28.

In this response essay in a journal edition devoted to love and religious ethics, Heyward agrees with Colin Grant that a preoccupation with the self can be detrimental. However, she proposes that the creative energy of *eros* is the best way to interpret God's relationship to the world. She believes that Grant and Anders Nygren are dualists, whereas, she and other feminists understand love in a nondualist, transformational way.

Heyward, Carter. *Touching Our Strength: The Erotic as Power and the Love of God*. New York: Harper and Row, 1989.

Hunt, Mary E. *Fierce Tenderness: Toward a Feminist Theology of Friendship*. New York: Seabury, 1987.

Mollenkott, Virginia. *The Divine Feminine: The Biblical Imagery of God as Female*. New York: Crossroad, 1983.

This text is a classic in its arguments to reclaim Biblical images of God as female. The author believes that understanding feminine image of God ultimately empowers both men and women. "I want to delve deeper into just one way in which the Bible supports human sexual equality and mutuality: the images of God as female that sprinkle the sacred writings of Judaism and Christianity" (7).

After surveying the history of what has happened to female imagery of God in Scripture, Mollenkott focuses on a series of Scriptural images and their implications for 20th century society. These feminine images found in scripture include God as a nursing mother, a mid-wife, a mother pelican, a female homemaker, a bakerwoman, female beloved, mother eagle, and Dame Wisdom.

Mollenkott concludes the tome with suggestions for how the understanding of the divine feminine might be included in contemporary worship. "If our goal is pointed inclusion of females in the feminine in the language of worship, we may find ourselves utilizing female god-images and pronouns as frequently as possible" (115). She also urges for Christians to refer to God in terms of the language of love. Because love has traditionally entailed characteristics more commonly assumed to be feminine, referring to God as love in Christian theology would be helpful in reclaiming the images and language association with femininity found in the Christian Bible.

Purvis, Sally. "Mothers, Neighbors and Strangers." *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion*. 7 (Spring 1991): 19-34.

Saiving, Valerie. "The Human Situation: A Feminine View." *Woman-spirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion*. ed. Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.

***Islam**

Muhaiyaddeen, M. R. Bawa. *A Book of God's Love*. Philadelphia: Fellowship Press, 1981.

This book is a devotional book of sorts, published by a Muslim society in the United States. The author is a Sufi mystic from Sri Lanka. The author advocates compassionate love as an instance in the ray of God's infinite love. The author's intent is to "lighten your heart, a map to help you find the treasure hidden within you. That treasure contains the most valuable and elusive things in life which everyone seeks but very few ever find -- unconditional love, everlasting youth, and unchanging truth" (ix).

Muhaiyaddeen suggests that the only kind of love that is truly beneficial is selfless love. "Unless love is connected to God, unless it is connected to truth, to compassion, to justice, and to grace, it is possible for it to breakdown" (7). God's love must take shape within humanity, which means that divine love must form in human hearts. Such love includes the suffering with those who suffer and selflessly giving to those who are in need. "We must draw that grace and that treasure within us. This love is true love, the love borne of faith and trust, the love borne of brotherly unity, the love that comes from being one family, the love that comes from prayer, the love that comes from merging with God, the love which has no limit" (20). The author argues that love entails relationships with others. "Once you have God's love, God's qualities, and God's actions, everyone is connected to you, and therefore you will feel the

suffering no matter whose it is” (24).

***Other**

Allen, Diogenes. *The Path of Perfect Love*. Cowley Publications, 1992.

Allen, professor of philosophy at Princeton Seminary, wrote this book because he believed that academic theology was in a state of skepticism. He argues throughout that traditional doctrines of Christianity are best understood when grounded upon the doctrine of divine love. Humans perceive the presence of God in both the natural and human environment, which means that humans experience love in ordinary daily life. This also means that the entire universe is conceived in love, sustained by love, and directed towards its consummation. In this sense, love has cosmic proportions.

In light of understanding Christianity as founded upon love, Allen argues that Christians must act differently. In particular, Christians must: be attentive to academic and scientific disciplines, learn to see ourselves as the objects of perfect love, aware of that which is beyond our present life, pay attention to Jesus and confess what we see in Him, and forsake the world. Death should be seen as the complete destruction of the self-centered life that we now have, and life after death as resurrection should be understood as possible because of divine love. The author sums up the book by saying that he has argued that the presence of God can be perceived indirectly by a person who is moving away from a self-centered stance and who has forsaken the world. “The more our life is disciplined by attentiveness to others, and the more we cultivate an awareness of the inability of the world to give us the fulfillment that we crave, the deeper and clearer is our awareness of God’s presence” (103).

Brown, Norman O. *Love’s Body*. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1966.

Brown’s book consists of various quotes from philosophers, theologians, psychologists, and others. Each quote has something to do with how love relates to a certain topic. Among the chapter titles are the following: Liberty, Nature, Trinity, Unity, Person, Representative, Head, Boundary, Food, Fire, Resurrection, Fulfillment, Judgment, Freedom, and Nothing. The book provides a rich resource for those looking for quotes and words of wisdom on the particular subjects mentioned in the chapter titles.

Brummer, Vincent. *The Model of Love*. Cambridge: University Press, 1993.

Buscaglia, Leo. *Love*. New York: Fawcett Crest, 1972

Buscaglia is a professor of education and much traveled speaker. This book is written for a popular audience and is not intended to be scholarly or philosophical. It is, as Buscaglia says, “a sharing of some of the practical and vital ideas, feelings and observations which emerged from the group which seemed to me relevant to the human condition” (12). The beauty and novelty of the text is its accessibility to a broad public readership and its relative accuracy.

Callen, Barry L. *God as Loving Grace: The Biblically Revealed Nature and Work of God*. Nappanee, Ind.: Evangel, 1996.

Edwards, Denis. *The God of Evolution: A Trinitarian Evolution*. Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1999.

Farley, Edward. *Divine Empathy: A Theology of God*. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996.

Fiddes, Paul S. *The Creative Suffering of God*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1988.

The author surveys recent thought about the suffering of God and, along the way, develops his own ideas of divine suffering. Fiddes notes at the outset that theological statements throughout the history of the church have tended to support a view of God as unmoving, unchanging and unsuffering. Today, however, at least academic theologians emphasize their strong conviction that God does suffer. The author attempts to offer a coherent notion of a God who both suffers and yet can fulfill divine purposes. The view he offers understands God as freely choosing to be self-limited, to suffer change, to be affected by time, and experience death, while remaining the living God. The author is especially influenced by process theological conceptions, but, in the end, the position he takes is his own; it is not in line with “orthodox” process thought.

Four major contributions have been made to the present debate about whether God suffers. The first, represented by Jurgen Moltmann, understands the suffering of God as being derived from the theology of the cross. The nature of God is revealed in the cross of Jesus as God participates in human history. A second major contribution comes from American process philosophy. In this vision, every participant, including God, is bound in a network of mutual influences with others. This means that divine suffering becomes central to divine action. The third dominant contribution to the present debate on the suffering of God comes from the mid-20th century “Death of God” theological movement. Finally, those whose sympathies remain with classical theism continue to exert some influence in the debate. “A theology of a suffering God needs to weave all four of these strands into a pattern, or to use another image, it must stand where four ways cross” (15). The chapters in the book explore the four major contributors to the current debate upon divine suffering.

In a chapter Fiddes titles, *Why Believe in a Suffering God*, he proposes four reasons why this theme is especially important in contemporary theology. First, it is difficult to understand what it means to say that God is a loving God if God does not suffer. Second, if the cross of Jesus Christ is central to Christian theology, this implies a notion of a God who is affected by the world and its experiences. Third, the problem of human suffering, itself, calls for a Creator who suffers along with creatures in pain. Finally, the scientific and natural view of existence supports the idea of an interactive deity.

Fuller, Millard. *Theology of a Hammer*. Macon, Ga.: Smyth and Helwys, 1994.

Fuller is the founder and president of Habitat for Humanity, an organization that builds homes for the poor. This book offers numerous anecdotes and illustrations concerning work in Habitat for Humanity since its inception. The author speaks from a Christian perspective and identifies core Christian convictions that undergird his ministry.

Fuller contends that the theology of the hammer means that Christian faith demands more than just talk and singing. “We must put faith and love into action to make them real, to make them come alive for people” (7). This theology is also about bringing together diverse peoples, churches, and organizations to help build houses and establish viable communities. Even though those involved may have diverse political, philosophical, or theological preferences “we can agree on the imperative of the Gospel to serve others in the name of the Lord” (7). Fuller believes that sufficient resources exist for solving the problem of poverty housing and homelessness. “Everybody made in the image of God, and that’s the whole crowd, ought to have a decent place to live and on terms they can afford to pay” (17). Although his work consists mainly stories of practical work in building homes, Fuller acknowledges that, in addition to the Bible, he

has been influenced by such theologians as Walter Rauschenbush, Albert Schweitzer, Alan Durning, Henri Nouwen, and Dorothy Day.

Grant, Colin. "For the Love of God: Agape." *Journal of Religion Ethics*. 24.1 (Spring, 1996): 3-21.

Grant offers this, the lead essay in a journal edition devoted to love and religious ethics, as a reaffirmation of basic themes on love forwarded a half-century earlier by Anders Nygren. In particular, Grant laments the displacement of *agape* by *eros* in contemporary love theology and ethics. Furthermore, he notes that *philia* has also supplanted *agape* as the dominant love for theology and ethics. Finally, what Grant calls "enlightenment *agape*" predominant in Gene Outka's work has replaced the primarily theological foundation of *agape* as understood originally by Nygren. Grant believes that *agape* should be the essential and indispensable theological basis and direction for theological ethics.

Irwin, Alexander C. *Eros Toward the World: Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic*. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991.

Jackson, Timothy. *Love Disconsolated: Meditations on Christian Charity*. Cambridge: University Press, 1999.

Jackson's book is comprised of fairly divergent essays addressing the role of *agape* love as he construes it in relation to various issues and texts. Chapter one, "Biblical Keys to Love," reveals that his theology of love is based primarily upon his interpretation of *agape* in the New Testament. The story of Jesus Christ provides the key to understanding love in the Bible and also the content and rationale for Christian charity. Jackson defines *agape* as the New Testament Greek word for the steadfast love that God has for human beings, as well as the neighbor-love humans are to have for one another (11). "Only because God first loves us gratuitously," says Jackson, "are we commanded and enabled to love God unreservedly and to love fellow human beings as we ought to love ourselves" (12). *Agape* as found in scripture is characterized by three interpersonal features: "(1), unconditional commitment to the good of others; (2), equal regard for the well-being of others; and (3), passionate service open to self-sacrifice for the sake of others" (15). Jackson stresses that *agape*, as he understands it, does not make self-sacrifice essential; however, openness to self-sacrifice, under the right circumstances, is definitive of the virtue of *agape*.

Jackson distinguishes between what he calls “strong *agape*” and “weak *agape*.” By strong *agape*, he means love as the primary human source and end that is indispensable for moral insight and power. Strong *agape* is a metavalue by which both individual integrity and social civility turn on a commitment to care for something larger than oneself or one’s tribe. In contrast, weak *agape* understands love as a moral virtue or value among equals with which it competes. When addressing *eros* and *philia*, Jackson argues both are dependent upon *agape* for their beginning and their ordered continuing.

With regard to ethical theory, Jackson argues that *agape* is like a duty in that it is not merely an optional good deed. However, *agape* is more than a duty in that it is not merely obligation among others. Rather, *agape* is what Jackson calls “primal goodness, the impetus behind all ethical actions and principles” (28). Strong *agape* between human beings involves three dimensions of the moral life: traits of character, forms of action, and concrete social consequences. The ethic of strong *agape* insists “that we are always called to do the loving thing, but it does not deny the relevance of agent-character or action-consequence” (214).

In chapter two, Jackson uses novels written by Ernest Hemmingway and F. Scott Fitzgerald to wrestle with the question of whether *agape* should be understood as an instance of prudence or an instance of self-sacrifice. He concludes that neither view is adequate for the long-suffering love of *agape* as understood in the Christian gospel.

Chapter three’s discussion addresses *agape*, *eros*, *philia* and self-love by looking at the works of Augustine, Sigmund Freud, Simone Weil, and Edward Vacek. Neither Freud nor Augustine have an adequate conception of Christian charity because, as he sees it, *eros*, *philia*, and self-love grow out of *agape* as its proper fruits and are secondary goods in comparison with the priority of *agape* itself. *Agape* wills the good of others for their own sakes, but, in willing that good, *agape* may require sacrifice that outstrips the demand of strict justice and natural preference.

In the chapter from which the book takes its title, Jackson examines how Christianity’s putting charity first among the theological virtues compares to a consoling, Boethian view of ethics. A chastened view of charity best serves Christian epistemology and ethics, but a denial of foundationalism in epistemology does not require the loss of moral realism. Christian theology’s priority of love rises above the question of immortality as endless life. “Putting charity first implies that immortality is not the greatest good, nor probably a necessary means to the greatest good” (170).

Jackson concludes the book with thoughts on how love is expressed through the cross of Christ. Love must be weaned away from traditional claims to certainty, invulnerability, immortality, and irresistible grace. The strong agapist stands for the priority of love among genuine values and the steadfastness of love among real doubts.

Marion, Jean-Luc. *God Without Being*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

In this tome heavily influenced by Continental theology and philosophy, the author argues that true love theology needs to abandon all metaphysics of the subject. It needs to embrace a revelation-based strategy for Christian love theology, not requiring any co-relational stance between theology and modernity. God's revelation of love is a pure gift beyond reason and incomprehensible. Marion's conversation partners in this book include Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida.

Theology is only proper when done within the horizon of God's own self-revelation as *agape*. While God exists, Marion does not believe that one ought to ascribe being to God. "Under the title, 'God Without Being,'" explains Marion, "I am attempting to bring out the absolute freedom of God with regard to all determinations, including, first of all, the basic condition that renders all other conditions possible and even necessary – for us, humans, the fact of Being" (xx).

While for humans it is necessary to be in order to love, "God is love" comes before "God as Being." God's primary theological name is charity, and in this sense Marion's enterprise is postmodern and similar to Derrida. Marion concludes by suggesting that what can be known about God comes only in so far as God gives Himself as a gift, the "gift gives only itself."

McFague, Sallie. *Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age*. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987.

Moltmann, Jurgen. *The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God*. trans. Margaret Kohl. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981.

As one of the most influential theologians of the contemporary period, Jürgen Moltmann's works have influenced a variety of theologies of love. *The Trinity and the Kingdom* brings together many themes found in his other books (e.g., *The Suffering God* and *God in Creation*), including the notion that God truly suffers with creaturely pain and that God is present and active in the world.

What makes *The Trinity and the Kingdom* especially interesting for the science-and-love discussion is how Moltmann wrestles to explain how it is that God is essentially loving. He acknowledges the truth of what many other love theorists have claimed: "love cannot be consummated by a solitary subject. An individuality cannot communicate itself: individuality is ineffable, unutterable" (57). This implies, says

Moltmann, that “if God is love, then he neither will, nor can, be without the one who is his beloved” (58). Furthermore, because love relations imply some degree of need, God cannot be, in all ways, self-sufficient: “If God is love, then he does not merely emanate, flow out of himself; he also expects and needs love” (99). Using “suffering” in its classical sense, which means to be affected by another, Moltmann argues that, “if God were incapable of suffering in every respect, then he would also be incapable of love” (23).

The answer to many issues pertaining to divine love can be found when examining relations within Trinity. God “is at once the lover, the beloved, and the love itself” (57). This intraTrinitarian love is illustrated by the fact that, “in eternity and out of the very necessity of his being, the Father loves the only begotten Son. . . . In eternity and out of the very necessity of his being, the Son responds to the Father’s love through his obedience and his surrender to the Father” (58). Three notions *together* – divine persons, divine relations, and change in divine relations -- provide the basis for conceiving of intraTrinitarian love. Because love has everlastingly been expressed through intraTrinitarian relations, love can be considered an essential attribute of God.

Moltmann entertains several hypotheses in *The Trinity and the Kingdom* for conceiving the correlation between the creation of the world and the Trinity. Sometimes he speaks of God creating from chaos; other times of God creating from nothing. He even places these apparently contradictory notions alongside each other; he speaks of divine creating as “creation out of chaos and *creatio ex nihilo*” (109). He claims that “creation [is] God’s act in Nothingness and . . . God’s order in chaos” (109). However, the evidence from his statements about God’s love for the world being voluntary while the love between the Father and Son is necessary leads one to conclude that Moltmann ultimately affirms *creatio ex nihilo*, rather than creation from chaos.

The creation hypothesis Moltmann proposes most vigorously, however, is based soundly upon intraTrinitarian suppositions: “If we proceed from the inner-trinitarian relationships of the Persons in the Trinity, then it becomes clear that the Father creates the one who is his Other by virtue of his love for the Son” (112). Because of this desire to communicate to nondivine individuals, it was through the eternal Son/Logos [that] the Father creates the world. In fact, “the idea of the world is inherent in the nature of God himself from eternity” (106). This means that “the idea of the world is already inherent in the Father’s love of the Son” (108). Because God creates the world in his love for the Son and creates through the Son, the Son “is the divinely immanent archetype of the idea of the world” (112). The solution to how God and the world are related, then, is to suppose that the idea of the world has been eternally present to deity in the Son.

Moltmann has been at the fore in suggesting that kenosis, as God’s self-emptying love, should be seen as the clue to God’s loving creation and interaction with the world. “The divine kenosis which begins with the creation of the world reaches its perfected and completed form in the incarnation of the son” (118). This self-emptying kenosis provides the key for understanding how God can be, in essence, wholly

omnipotent and yet completely loving. God, in free self-sacrifice, gives up power, knowledge, and presence to allow space for creatures to be.

Murphy, Nancey and Ellis, George F. R. *On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996.

The book is co-written by Murphy, who is a professor of Christian philosophy, and Ellis, who is professor of applied mathematics. Both are members of the Anabaptist Christian tradition, and their thought, especially as it relates to pacifism and ethics, reveal this connection to Christian tradition. One of the book's virtues is that its authors clearly lay out their proposals in a very accessible manner.

The overall argument for the book is the following: the fine-tuning of the cosmological constants that has produced a life-bearing universe calls for an explanation. The authors believe that a theistic explanation offers a more coherent account of reality than a non-theistic one. The pattern of divine action in the world, however, seems to indicate that God works with nature, "never over-riding or violating the very processes that God has created" (xv). The fact the God does not violate or override the processes leads the authors to believe that divine action entails refusal to do violence to creation. They link this with kenosis, a Christian New Testament word typically translated, "self-emptying." God renounces self-interest for the sake of the other, no matter what the cost is to God, and that this divine activity ought to be emulated by humans. The authors call for a new research program to explore the possibilities of this kenosis thesis in light of science.

The ethical core of the proposal is that self-renunciation for the sake of the other is humankind's highest goal. One of the more illuminating chapters in the book addresses the power of persuasion, non-violent coercion, and violent coercion. The authors argue that persuasion is to be preferred and they speculate that "a consistent policy of using the least coercive means possible in each social situation will affect the character of the individuals involved such that less coercion will be needed in future resolution of conflict" (151). In sum, contemporary cosmology points ultimately to an ethic that centers on self-sacrifice and non-violence.

Newlands, George M. *Theology of the Love of God*. Atlanta: John Knox, 1981.

Oord, Thomas Jay. *An Essentially Loving God: An Open and Relational Theology of Love*. Forthcoming.

Oord, Thomas Jay. "Divine Love." *Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction to Issues*. Thomas Jay Oord, ed. Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press, 2003.

Oord offers a lengthy introductory essay to the various issues pertaining to how one might conceive of divine love. Addressed are topics such as love's definition, love archetypes *agape*, *eros*, and *philia*, major love theologians and leaders in various religious traditions, the impact of how one understands God's relation to the world, the question of love as divine will or nature, and other pertinent matters related to love.

Osborne, Catherine. *Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Outka, Gene. "Theocentric Agape and the Self: An Asymmetrical Affirmation in Response to Colin Grant's Either/Or." *Journal of Religion Ethics* 24.1 (Spring 1996): 35-42.

In this response essay in a journal edition devoted to love and religious ethics, Outka agrees with Colin Grant that *agape* is distinctive and that a theocentric account of it should be given. However, Outka rejects Grant's argument that Anders Nygren's particular conception of altruism should be endorsed. In particular, Outka rejects Nygren's understanding of unilateral action by God's part in terms of love. In general, Outka rejects Grant's characterization of Outka's own ethical theory of impartiality as what Grant calls "enlightenment ethics."

Pinnock, Clark H. *Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit*. Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996.

Pinnock, Clark H., et. al. *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God*. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1994.

Pinnock joins four other authors to provide one of the more hotly debated books on the doctrine of God amongst Evangelical Christians. At the root of the vision of deity they designate the "Open God" is their shared conviction that love is God's

chief attribute, and all other divine attributes must not undermine the primacy of love.

In order to offer a coherent doctrine of God, essayists address issues of divine transcendence, immanence, power, omniscience, mutability, and passibility. At the core of his proposal is his account of divine loving activity that includes God's responsiveness, generosity, sensitivity, openness, and vulnerability. In fact, Clark Pinnock contends that "love rather than almighty power is the primary perfection of God" (114).

Essayists in *The Openness of God* argue that no doctrine is more central to the Christian faith than the doctrine of God. Laying out a coherent, livable, biblical doctrine is crucial for the practical and theoretical aspects of theology. Many Christians, however, observe an inconsistency between their beliefs about the nature of God and their religious practice. For example, Christians ask God to act in a certain way when they pray, although their formal theology may suppose that God has predetermined all things. A major factor in assessing the viability of a theological scheme, then, is the piety question: How well does this "live?"

"How can we expect Christians to delight in God or outsiders to seek God if we portray God in biblically flawed, rationally suspect, and existentially repugnant ways?" asks Pinnock (104). In his attempt to avoid rationally suspect hypotheses, Pinnock seeks to offer a coherent doctrine of God, i.e., each divine attribute "should be compatible with one another and with the vision of God as a whole" (101).

The Openness of God authors share the basic conviction that love is the principal theme in Christian theology. Pinnock insists, for instance, that love is the primary perfection of God. Richard Rice, who assumes the task of offering biblical support for the open view advanced in the book, claims that the open view expresses two basic convictions Scripture supports. First, love is the most important quality humans attribute to God. Second, love is more than care and commitment; it also involves sensitivity and responsiveness. Rice further notes that, from a Christian perspective, *love* is the first and last word in the biblical portrait of God. When one enumerates God's qualities, one must not only *include* love on the list, but, to be faithful to the Bible, one must put love at the *head* of that list. A doctrine of God faithful to the Bible must show that all God's characteristics derive from love. Rice concludes: "Love, therefore, is the very essence of the divine nature. Love is what it means to be God" (19).

Pinnock embraces the notion that God is like a loving parent when affirming these hypotheses. In this parental model, God possesses "qualities of love and responsiveness, generosity and sensitivity, openness and vulnerability" (103). God is a person who experiences the world, responds to what happens, relates to humans, and interacts dynamically with creatures.

Essayists reject the classic conception of God described as "an aloof monarch" removed from the world's contingencies, i.e., the entirely transcendent God. They reject the deity who is completely unchangeable, all-determining, irresistible, and does not risk. "The Christian life involves a genuine interaction between God and human

beings,” Pinnock contends. “We respond to God’s gracious initiatives and God responds to our responses . . . and on it goes” (7).

Essayists also deny divine foreordination, divine foreknowledge of free creaturely actions, and the hypothesis that either divine foreknowledge or unilateral determination are compatible with creaturely freedom. God knows all things that can be known, but divine omniscience does not mean that God possesses exhaustive foreknowledge of all future events. Total knowledge of the future would imply that future events are fixed. “If choices are real and freedom significant, future decisions cannot be exhaustively known,” Pinnock explains (123).

Pinnock, Clark H. and Robert C. Brow. *Unbounded Love: A Good News Theology for the 21st Century*. Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity, 1994.

Polkinghorne, John and Michael Welker, eds. *The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001.

In one of the best theoretical books pertaining to theologies of love at the interface with science, essayists of *The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis* grapple with how to envisage divine love at work in creation. Those who contributed essays to this book should be commended for adopting a kenotic framework for talking about divine creative love at work in the world.

The title word, *kenosis*, derives from a New Testament letter to a group of Christians in ancient Phillipi (Philippians 2:7). Biblical scholars typically translate *kenosis* as “self-emptying” or “self-offering.” Scholarly consensus does not exist, however, about how exactly to conceive of divine *kenosis*. Essayists in the book explore how varying notions of *kenosis* might help when imagining divine action in the world.

The Work of Love begins with a helpful overview essay by Ian Barbour. In his usual irenic and explanatory form, Barbour notes five themes that advocates of kenotic theology believe their perspective addresses more adequately than other theological alternatives. These themes include the integrity of nature, the problem of evil and suffering, the reality of human freedom, the Christian understanding of the cross, and feminist criticisms of the patriarchal God. Barbour also identifies particular themes in process theology as these they relate to creation, divine power, and love. Among these issues are the adequacy of God’s power, *creatio ex nihilo* and the Big Bang, eschatology and the Big Crunch, immortality, and resurrection.

Perhaps the most important issue highlighted by Barbour is the question whether, to display love, God is self-limited or limited due to metaphysical necessity.

He notes that process theists affirm the metaphysical limitation of divine power, because, among other reasons, that vision of God allows one to affirm unequivocally that God loves relentlessly even though evil events occur. “To say that the limitation of God’s power is a metaphysical necessity rather than a voluntary self-limitation,” cautions Barbour, “is not to say that it is imposed by something outside God. This is not a Gnostic or Manichean dualism in which recalcitrant matter restricts God’s effort . . .”(13). A question raised implicitly and to which I will return in my critique is this: Must divine *kenosis* be identified with voluntary divine self-limitation?

After Barbour’s piece, the book gradually moves from essays that are more scientifically oriented to those that are more theologically oriented – although virtually all essayists engage both scientific and religious issues. Arthur Peacocke contends in his essay that the evolutionary character of the actual process of creation justifies the notions that (1) God creates by self-offering and (2) God is self-limited. The data suggest that “biological evolution is continuous and evidences emergence of new forms of life” (22). The Hebrew conception of a living God correlates well with a God whose creative relation is dynamic, argues Peacocke, and this suggests that God is the “Immanent Creator.” There is no need to look for God as an “additional nonscientifically accessible factor supplementing these creative processes” (24).

While God is the ultimate ground and source of both law and necessity and of chance, God took a risk by creating through DNA mutations and randomness. In addition, suggests Peacocke, significant natural trends and propensities are built into evolution. These trends and propensities favor selection for complexity, information-processing and storage, pain and suffering, self-consciousness, and language. This all means that there can be “overall direction and implementation of divine purpose through chance (mutations) operating in a rule-obeying context (the environment) without a deterministic plan fixing in advance all the details of the structure(s) of what eventually emerges with personal qualities” (33). Divine purposiveness need not be divinely manipulated by special providence. “There is a creative self-emptying and self-offering (a *kenosis*) of *God*,” argues Peacocke. This entails “a sharing in the suffering of God’s creatures, in the very creative, evolutionary processes of the world” (38).

Holmes Rolston, III, takes up the current sociobiological dogma that life inevitably entails maximizing short-sighted selfishness. Rolston wonders if this dogma depends “not so much on empirical evidence as on the choice of a general interpretive framework from which to view the phenomena” (44). Providing a quick overview of various biological theories that suggest that organisms are both selfish and unselfish, Rolston argues that the sharing and taking of genes themselves should not be considered in moral categories. Genes are, in the ethical sense, neither altruistic nor egoistic. Rolston even suggests that “there are no moral agents in wild nature. . . . Only humans are moral agents” (49).

The precursor of human *kenosis* begins in nonhuman emptying into species of larger populational and species lines. Such nonhuman, nonmoral *kenosis* emerges in an ecology of organisms that are interdependent and symbiotic. *Kenosis* occurs in life itself

as the living order is perpetually redeemed in the midst of its perishing. “Death can be meaningfully integrated into the biological processes as a necessary counterpart to the advancing of life” suggests Rolston (59). “Creatures have been giving up their lives as a ransom for many. In that sense, Jesus is not the exception to the natural order, but a chief exemplification of it” (60).

Malcolm Jeeves focuses on recent evidence and theory in contemporary psychobiology. Recent evidence and theory sheds light on “the roots and fruits” of the self-giving component of kenotic behavior. Responding to the early 20th century work of psychologist William Sanday, Jeeves notes that many today view personhood, in general, and “souliness,” in particular, differently than Sanday. For instance, recent studies point to characteristics of souliness as present in nonhumans. In fact, claims Jeeves, “within the Christian tradition it is not necessary to deny the emergence of elements of kenotic behavior in nonhuman primates in order to defend the uniqueness of the self-giving and self-emptying Christ” (89). Also, recent work suggests that both “top-down” and “bottom-up” influence occurs between brain and mind, which means that neurobiology places limits on our thoughts and actions.

In terms of self-giving as originating in self-determination, Jeeves reports that one’s behavior is directly dependent upon genetic endowment, neural substrate, upbringing, and other factors. Jeeves concludes that the capacity for self-giving love may have polygenetic bases, and a kenotic community may be necessary for nurturing the development and expression of kenotic behavior.

The book’s editor, John Polkinghorne, tackles the age-old question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Answering this question, he contends, “involves appeal to the divine love that has willed the existence of the truly other so that, through creation, this love is also bestowed outside the perichoretic exchange between the Persons of the Holy Trinity.”

Polkinghorne turns to *kenosis* as a way other than, on one hand, process theology’s God. The process doctrine of God is “open to [the] question whether deity has not been so evacuated of power that hope in God as the ground of ultimate fulfillment has been subverted” (92). *Kenosis* offers a way other than, on the other hand, classical theology’s God. The God of classical theism “is in total control and whose invulnerability is such that there is no reciprocal effect upon the divine nature of a kind that a truly loving relationship would seem to imply” (92).

Although affirming *creatio ex nihilo*, Polkinghorne believes that the evolutionary character of the universe requires that one complement creation out of nothing with *creatio ex continua*. Creation has been allowed to make itself, and “no longer can God be held to be totally and directly responsible for all that happens” (95). The doctrine also tempers somewhat the problem of evil by “maintaining God’s total benevolence but qualifying, in a kenotic way, the operation of God’s power” (96). “Of course, this is a self-qualification,” adds Polkinghorne. Such self-limitation of divine power “is quite different from Process Theology’s conception of an external metaphysical constraint upon the power of deity,” because the *kenotic* vision maintains

“that nothing imposes conditions on God from the outside” (96). The picture of divine action Polkinghorne offers involves God’s interaction with, but not arbitrary interruption of, creation. Polkinghorne has “come to believe that the Creator’s kenotic love includes allowing divine special providence to act as a cause among causes” (104); God acts energetically as well as informationally.

George F. R. Ellis presents in his essay “the virtues of kenosis as a unifying theme in the understanding of both human life and cosmology” (107). Because God expresses *kenosis*, we ought to “be tuned to the welfare of others and of the world,” which entails self-sacrifice for the good of others. Divine *kenosis* is a voluntary choice whereby God exercises “total restraint in the use of God’s power,” suggests Ellis, “for otherwise a free response to God’s actions is not possible” (114). The purpose of the universe, says Ellis, is to make possible creaturely sacrificial responses to a sacrificial God. This requires a universe with some degree of order, creatures with freedom, impartial natural laws, a God whose nature and activity is largely hidden, yet a nature open to those who wish to discern some things about it.

Michael Welker offers a brief comparative essay on romantic, covenantal, and kenotic loves. Kenotic divine love “reveals that God turns lovingly to those who . . . in themselves do *not* have any potential to reveal the goodness of God . . . , [and] who in themselves do *not* have any potential to help transform the world according to God’s will” (134). God turns to creatures and gives them space in order to liberate them and to ennoble them to experience and enact divine love. In sum, “God’s kenotic love, revealed in Christ’s love and bestowed on creatures by the working of the Holy Spirit, draws human lives into the creative love that makes them bearers of God’s presence and the incarnation of the new creation” (136).

Jurgen Moltmann proffers a theological vision that inspires many of the book’s essayists. Moltmann argues that one must “ask about God’s presence in the history of nature and in the chance events that herald a future which cannot be extrapolated from the past or present” (138). The heart of Moltmann’s proposal is that God freely chooses to be the Creator of a world. God does so in that “(1) out of his infinite possibilities God realizes this particular [world], and renounces all others” and “(2) God’s self-determination to be Creator is linked with the consideration for his creation that allows it space and time and its own movement, so that it is not crushed by the divine reality or totally absorbed by it.” God “distances himself” from the world, and the “limitation of his infinity and omnipresence is itself an act of omnipotence” (145). God “withdrew himself into himself in order to make room for the world” and “to concede space for the presence of creation” (146). But it is for the sake of love that God is self-limited, according to Moltmann.

Keith Ward begins his essay by explaining that theologians in recent centuries have turned to kenotic theology so that they may speak of divine relationship with the world. Ward’s view of creation as *kenosis* includes the divine realization of possibilities eternally present in the divine being, which means that God enjoys values that would not have been enjoyable had a universe never been created.

Ward explores an idea that is a central issue to be addressed when seeking to advance an adequate conception of *kenosis*. “Perhaps some realization [of possibilities] is essential to the divine nature,” speculates Ward, “so that God necessarily creates other personal agents. If one thinks that ‘God is love’ (1 John 4:16), that love is an essential property of the divine nature, and that love can only be properly exercised in relation to others who are free to reciprocate love or not, then the creation of some universe containing free finite agents seems to be an implication of the divine nature” (159). Ward is hesitant to take this position, however, stating that it is “a rather presumptuous exercise” to speculate about the divine nature.

Paul Fiddes explores the “both problematic and immensely illuminating” claims that God creates out of love and love is at the heart of the universe. The claim that love is the reason for creation carries certain consequences, however. For instance, the claim implies that God has needs to be satisfied. It also implies that nondivine beings exist capable of relating lovingly with God. These two implications entail that both *agape* and *eros* are types of divine love.

The claim that a loving God needs responses from creatures leads to a problem: If God, as love, is necessarily related to others, how can the world be contingent and God be free? The answer that Fiddes prefers starts with the divine will instead of the divine nature. This is the nominalist tradition, which entails that “God freely determines the kind of God that God will be” (181). Among other things, this position states that God freely chooses to give and receive love. The difficulties of this position are partly logical, however, for it seems illogical that one begin choosing prior to having a nature. Nevertheless, Fiddes prefers this position because it denotes God as a participatory event. Another difficulty with this position is that we no longer trust in God’s love; instead, we must trust the divine will. Fiddes believes that he overcomes this objection by claiming that, although God’s eternal nature is not love, we can only identify God as love from a finite perspective.

Sarah Coakley’s essay concludes the book with a thesis that I noted early in this review: *kenosis* has been given a wide variety of meanings in different contexts in the Christian tradition. Coakley argues that decisions about theological starting points vitally affect the conclusions one reaches pertaining to how to conceive of *kenosis*. She notes that the self-sacrifice of *kenosis* has been a contentious theme in feminist theology, because it can be identified with the abasement that feminists seek to avoid.

Pope, Stephen J. *The Evolution of Altruism and the Ordering of Love*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994.

Pope’s work in *The Evolution of Altruism in the Ordering of Love* is of the highest caliber with regard to how theologies of love might interface with biological science. In many ways, Pope sets a standard that others would do well to follow, as he correlates

core notions, theories, and research from both religious studies and modern sociobiology.

Pope sets as his task the correlation of biological science, especially altruism, with a Catholic understanding of the ordering of love. He succinctly puts it this way: "I propose a contemporary biological interpretations of inter-human and human-natural interdependencies can be used to develop a more extensive and inclusive range of moral responsibility than is suggested by recent trends in catholic ethics" (8).

After surveying Roman Catholic writing on love that has emerged in recent years, Pope notes that Liberation theologians and those with Personalist theological leanings have neglected central notions of love that connect with what is natural. Liberation theologians have insisted -- to the neglect of other themes -- that the Church embrace a special regard for the poor, marginalized, and the oppressed. Personalist theologians have overemphasized the one-to-one interpersonal relationships of love. Pope turns to current scientifically-based theories of human nature to inform a contemporary Catholic love ethics.

The ordering of love the author has in mind incorporates both universal love of neighbor and a prioritizing of love toward others. Pope contends that we must remain attentive to the periodic conflicts between these two realms of responsibility, which in turn requires that we prioritize various objects of love. Correct prioritizing is exactly what recent Roman Catholic authors have failed to do.

Pope turns to Thomas Aquinas's account of the order of love, because this account includes features of human nature that must be considered if an adequate contemporary ethics of love is to be offered. For instance, Thomas overcomes the split between self-love and neighbor-love by speaking of proper and improper self-love and proper and improper neighbor-love. Although Thomas urged love for all, he also contended that the order of charity requires not only greater love, but also more intense affection, toward those nearest to the one loving.

Although not claiming a simple synthesis of Thomastic ethics with evolutionary theory, the author does point out several functional equivalencies between the two. Pope notes that evolutionary theory implies or explicitly affirms sociality or group-living, interaction with group members, communication, developing alliances with others, mating, and rearing offspring. For instance, Kinship Theory in contemporary evolutionary thought corresponds with Thomas' emphasis upon the priority of love for one's own family. Contemporary evolutionary theory also embraces the notion of reciprocity in its Reciprocity and Tit-for-Tat theories. Sociobiologists argue that we have evolved to be an intensely social beings. Evolutionary theory also claims, like Thomas, that self-love is based in human nature. This means that self-love is neither good nor bad -- neither a virtue nor a vice -- but simply an expression of what it means to be human. When considering the possibilities and resources of kin preference reciprocity and other social evolutionary characteristics, Pope claims that kin preference may be one of the most intuitively plausible claims of sociobiology. However, that reciprocity theory fails to grasp properly both the nature of trust and the nature of personal commitment engaged for the sake of another.

In a chapter entitled, "Evolution and Altruism: An Interpretation and Assessment," Pope wades through some of the main issues in his analysis of altruism and love. He notes the

sociobiological tendency to reduce all goods to the organism's inclusive fitness. This reductionism is neither empirically warranted nor morally justified. The author also notes that some sociobiologists promote determinism; but human love, though having a biological basis, implies neither that human reason, will, or choices are genetically controlled. While human behavior reflects its genetic heritage, it is also true, says Pope, that culture profoundly shapes the norms of altruism and family loyalty in a given society.

Although the predominant assumption in sociobiology is that all organisms are fundamentally egoistic and altruism is illusory, Pope notes that this assumption is at odds with mounting evidence that supports genuine altruism. Theories contending that organisms are exclusively egoistic do not account for the genuine altruism that many experience at least some time in their lives.

In sum, Pope contends that contemporary evolutionary theory provides (1) an empirical basis on which to develop a contemporary restatement of the order of love, (2) an evolutionary basis for the claim that self-love is naturally prior to love for others, (3) a base for the claim that intimacy in shared life between spouses constitutes the greatest friendships with which human beings are capable, and (4) an evolutionary base for a debt of gratitude to one's parents. Pope argues that the determining of priorities among the various objects of love requires an exercise of moral discernment. The ordering of love is based in, but not determined by, nature.

Post, Stephen G. "A Moral Case for Nonreductive Physicalism," *Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature*. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Maloney, eds. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1998.

Post, Stephen G. *A Theory of Agape: On the Meaning of Christian Love*. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1990.

This work is an innovative and creative endeavor in Christian love theology. The author proposes various doctrinal hypotheses concerning adequate notions of *agape* love. The author's intention is "to challenge various assumptions and settled orthodoxies in order to move the literature on love in a new direction" (9).

Among the claims made are the following: love should be understood as a communion or mutuality between God, self and neighbor. This Christian love is found within the fellowship of Christian believers and informed by the Christian tradition. Love can involved a degree of self fulfillment. Also, God is a suffering God who is affected by human responses to divine calls for love. "The western tendency to idolize selfless love devoid of even the slightest iota of self concern is an aberration from the valid ideal of unselfishness in fellowship" (12).

Post understands the chief purpose of neighbor love as raising the neighbor toward God and toward the fellowship of Christian believers who share a vision of divine love. He argues that *agape* should not be equated with strict self denial; neither should *agape* be reduced to the universal love of humanity. Rather, because Christian love is participatory and occurs in fellowship, *agape* is nurtured and sustained in communities. This also means that the development and furtherance of the habits of love occurs best within the Christian family.

Post concludes the book by noting the necessary link between freedom and love. “In the absence of freedom no person will fully express his or her inmost self, and attempts to coerce this affective self revelation inevitably breed resentment” (117).

Post, Stephen G. “The Inadequacy of Selflessness: God’s Suffering and the Theory of Love.” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 50 (1988): 213-228.

Soelle, Dorothee with Shirley A. Cloyes. *To Work and to Love: A Theology of Creation*. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984.

Templeton, Sir John. *Pure Unlimited Love: An Eternal Creative Force and Blessing Taught By All Religions*. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2000.

Templeton offers this inspirational book on love as a brief explanation for what he considers the creative force in all religions. He defines pure, unlimited love as the “transcendent power of divine love that expresses itself through our hearts and minds when we are open and receptive to it.”

Each short chapter answers the question posed in its title. For instance, in the chapter titled, “Can Unlimited Love Eliminate Conflict?”, Templeton responds that it can because love enables one to ignore adversity, insults, loss and injustice. The final chapter includes these words: “Whatever the need or circumstance, love can find a way to adjust, heal, or resolve any problem or situation” (56).

Taylor, Mark Lloyd and Carmen Renee Berry. *Loving Yourself as Your Neighbor: A Recovery Guide for Christians Escaping Burnout and Codependency*. New York: Harper and Row, 1990.

Vacek, Edward. "Love, Christian and Diverse." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 24.1 (Spring 1996): 29-41.

In this response essay found in a journal edition devoted to love and religious ethics, Vacek argues that although *agape* is one important form of love within the Christian life, it does not follow that *agape* is *the* distinctive form of Christian love. Within his own Roman Catholic theological tradition, *philia*, *agape*, and *eros* are all required for a full understanding of love. In fact, the most inclusive of the loves is *philia*, not *agape*.

Vanhoozer, Kevin, ed. *Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001.

This collection of edited essays is a decidedly theological work with little or no reflection on how scientific matters might affect theologies of love. Its value is that it represents the work of theologians, mostly from Reformed theological traditions, who wrestle with how to conceive of divine love.

The book's editor, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, begins his introductory essay -- the best essay of the book -- by noting that "it is exceedingly odd that Christian theologians have themselves been somewhat indifferent -- inattentive, neutral -- with regard to the concept of the love of God" (1). It is no exaggeration to say that the defining and situating of divine love is the perennial task of Christian theology.

A growing number of Christian theologians believe that a major advance, even a revolution, in the understanding of the love of God has recently occurred. The traditional view of God entails that the deity metes out good but takes neither joy nor delight in the good that comes about. This classical God is immutable and impassable. Several developments in the twentieth century, however, have changed the way we understand divine love. Among the movements that have generated these developments are process philosophy, Trinitarian theology, liberation theology, feminist theology, and various Postmodern thinkers, like Jean- Luc Marion.

Vanhoozer notes "the concept of the love of God is both fundamental to the doctrine of God and, oddly, disruptive of it. There seems to be no place in a systematics in which the notion of the love of God neatly fits" (13). When discussing the structure of systematic theology, Vanhoozer observes that the love of God functions either (1) "as a discrete doctrinal topic" or (2) "as the structuring principle that provides a point of integration or thematic unity between individual doctrines." "Somewhat surprisingly," states Vanhoozer, "few theologians have chosen that latter option" (14).

In the second half of the opening essay, Vanhoozer briefly discusses how love

affects issues such as divine sovereignty, reciprocal relations, divine control, divine suffering, and panentheism. After addressing these issues, he concludes that “we must say at least three things: the love of God is something that God has, something that God does, and something that God is” (23). Vanhoozer closes his introduction by claiming that “the moral of this introduction is that the love of God should occupy no one place in a theological system, but every place” (29).

The rest of *Nothing Greater, Nothing Better* book includes a variety of essays of varying degrees of helpfulness. Gary Badcock looks at Anders Nygren’s famous work, *Agape and Eros* and concludes, like many others before him, that it is appropriate to speak of divine *eros*. On the basis of God’s act in Christ, that is, creaturely response to divine initiative is something that God needs.

Geoffrey Grogan reviews a diversity of the biblical evidence pertaining to love. Lewis Ayres reflects upon Augustine’s understanding of the love of God as it is expressed in St. Augustine’s commentary on First John and in his work, *On the Trinity*.

Trevor Hart considers the question of how we speak of God. Following Karl Barth, he concludes that the possibility of human speech about God rests entirely upon the incarnation. What we have in the incarnation is a God-given analogy. Alan Torrance also addresses analogical language, the incarnation, the trinity, and other issues. Torrance wonders if love can be understood as God’s essence, and, disappointingly from this reviewer’s perspective, concludes that this question is unanswerable. He also rejects natural theology and argues that only those who have fellowship with Christ will allow their minds and language become transformed as to speak adequately of God.

Tony Lane addresses the question of God’s wrath in relation to God’s love. Lane concludes that one must not affirm wrath as part of God’s essence. Paul Helm addresses the question: Can God love the world? One of his conclusions is that God could not be equally benevolent to all human beings, but God can love all humans unequally. Helm also suggests, inaccurately from this reviewer’s perspective, that the problem of evil is a matter of degree. David Fergusson addresses the issues of eschatology by asking the question, “Will the love of God ultimately triumph?” After all, if God’s future is genuinely open, divine triumph over evil is not a foregone conclusion. Fergusson argues that those who affirm double predestination and those who affirm universalism ultimately remove human freedom by construing God’s love as something that constrains human choice. Roy Clements concludes the book with a sermon on Hosea, chapter eleven.

Vanier, Jean. *Becoming Human*. Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1999.

The book entails the material of five talks that its author, Jean Vanier, gave on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio program. Vanier is the founder of “L’Arche,” which is an international network in more than 30 countries for people with

intellectual disabilities.

The author comments that the book springs from his experience of humanness and not directly from his life of faith. In this sense the book is more about anthropology than about spirituality. “This book is about the liberation of the human heart from the tentacles of chaos and loneliness,” writes its author, “and from those fears that provoke us to exclude and reject others. It is a liberation that opens us up and leads us to the discovery of our common humanity” (5). Among the subjects addressed in the chapters are the following: loneliness, belonging, inclusion, freedom and forgiveness. The author argues that by opening ourselves to outsiders we can achieve true personal and societal freedom, which includes the freedom to become truly human.

Vanstone, W. H. *The Risk of Love*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

In his struggles to understand the role of the church and what God requires, the author looks to a robust notion of love, including understanding the nature of God in a way that is amenable to the structure of love. The work in the initial segments is largely autobiographical as the author identifies his own journey to the theology of love that he eventually proposes.

In attempting to understand the purpose of the church, Vanstone wrestles with what it might mean for the church to glorify God. He comes to believe that God can be glorified only if God is truly interested in the work of the church. It is the importance of the church’s work and his awareness of material reality that leads Vanstone to suppose that the whole of creation is a work of love.

After rejecting the idea that divine love is wholly dissimilar to creaturely love, the author argues that we must extrapolate from the authentic love that we see around us in the creaturely world. In his analysis of the phenomenology of love, Vanstone discovers three signs of authentic love. The first is that authentic love has no limitation, in the sense that it does not choose to love some people and hate others. This does not mean that love is not constrained by circumstances, however. The authenticity of unlimited love involves the totality of giving of oneself to the other. The second mark of authentic love is the giving up of control. Love becomes distorted when it attempts to possess or manipulate the other. This means that love is risky, for it cannot control the other and often fails in its attempt to benefit the other. The third mark of authentic love is that the other affects it. The love gives to the object a certain power over the one loving. The one loved affects the one loving. This means that lovers are vulnerable.

Upon examining a phenomenology of creaturely love, Vanstone turns to address divine love. He attributes to God a love that is limitless, vulnerable, and precarious. He appeals to the idea of kenosis, in the sense that God is self-giving in expression of love for creatures. The activity of God’s love in creation is precarious, by which Vanstone means that it must not “proceed by an assured programme” (62).

The precariousness of divine love is especially evident in the fact that evil exists. The fact that evil occurs implies that there is an other that is not divine; it does not imply that evil is willed by the creator. Vanstone argues that the God who foreordains and predetermines cannot be a God who loves. “If the creation is the work of love, its ‘security’ lies not in its conformity to some predetermined plan, but in the unsparing love that will not abandon a single fragment of it, and man’s assurance must be the assurance not that all that happens is determined by God’s plan, but that all that happens is encompassed by His love” (66). When addressing the vulnerability of divine love, Vanstone contends that divine loving activity can result in either triumph or tragedy. Which of these two it will be is determined in part by creaturely response. This implies that God has need. For divine love to become complete, it must wait upon the understanding of those who receive it. This means that the creativity of God is dependent upon the responsive creativity of the creatures.

Trinitarian theology fulfills the requirement that God needs another. “Trinitarian theology asserts that God’s love for His creation is not the love that is borne of ‘emptiness’ . . . it is the love which overflows from fullness” (69). “Of such a nature is the ‘kenosis’ of God is the self-emptying of Him Who is already in every way fulfilled” (69). It is God who awaits a response from creation, a response that issues in either triumph or tragedy. “Tentatively, but with growing assurance, theology may interpret the dynamic of nature as the activity of love” (85).

The proper human response to God amounts to the celebration of God’s love, and that by which the love of God is celebrated may be called “the church.” The church is wider than any recognized ecclesiastical structure, however, it includes the simplest action done out of awareness of God’s love. The church, says Vanstone, is “the sum of all the structures and forms within which man expressed the recognition of the love of God” (97). In the visible church, humans aspire to create something that expresses their recognition of God’s love. The church exists as the point in which the love of God is most profoundly exposed as the possibility for tragedy or triumph.

****Process Theology***

Cobb, John B. Jr. *The Structure of Christian Existence*. New York: Seabury Press, 1979.

Cobb, John B. Jr. and David Ray Griffin. *Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976.

This book serves as the seminal introduction to process thought written by two of the most important contemporary figures in this tradition. Because process thought has been drawn upon by so many in the science and religion dialogue, this text serves as

a valuable resource for those wanting to become acquainted with the concepts that so many find valuable.

Perhaps the most important chapter of the book is the third, titled “God as Creative-Responsive Love.” The authors note that Process Theology, as they employ it, operates from the perspective of Christian faith on one hand and a metaphysical context provided by Process Philosophy on the other. The authors explore what the Biblical phrase “God is Love” means, and they begin with an exposition of what it means for God to express sympathy. Cobb and Griffin note that in classical theology, divine sympathy was denied: “This denial of an element of sympathetic responsiveness to the divine love meant that it was entirely creative; that is, God loves us only in the sense that he does good things for us” (45). The authors note that the traditional notion of love as solely creative was partly introduced to deny that God is dependent upon creatures in any way and that God’s independence implies perfection. Process theology, by contrast, understands God’s emotional state as dependent upon creaturely existence. “Upon this basis, Christian *agape* can come to have the element of sympathy, of compassion for the present situation of others, which it should have had all along” (48).

The authors contend that the creative activity of God is no less essential to understanding divine love than is the sympathetic aspect of divine love. For instance, a loss of belief in the creative side of God’s love would tend to undermine liberation movements of various kinds. The creative love of God, however, is persuasive only. The Cobb and Griffin note that the idea that God can intervene coercively has led to a variety of problems, especially with regard to the understanding the problem of evil and the science-inhibiting notion of the “God of the gaps.” By “persuasion” the authors mean to deny that God has the ability to exercise controlling, unilateral power. “Process theologies understanding of divine love as in harmony with the insight, which we can gain both from psychologists and from our own experience, that if we truly love others we do not seek to control them” (53).

Cobb and Griffin note several advantages that their understanding of God as Creative-Responsive love entails. One notion is that God is understood as promoting enjoyment instead of as the Cosmic Moralist. “In traditional Christianity, morality and enjoyment were often seen as in fundamental opposition. In Process Thought, morality stands in the service of enjoyment” (57). Another advantage of understanding God’s love as creative/responsive is that divine love can be understood as adventurous. A God’s creative activity that is exclusively persuasive corresponds with a love that takes risks. This means that deity is not the sanctioner of the status quo, but God is still the source of the order that emerges in the world. God is the source of order because God offers possibilities to creatures to respond in ways that increase enjoyment and design. A third advantage of understanding God as Creative-Responsive love is that this entails that God’s life is also on an adventure. Finally, the God that Process Thought envisions possesses qualities typically considered feminine. For instance, God is passive, responsive, emotional, flexible, patient, and appreciative of beauty.

Ford, Lewis S. "Divine Persuasion and Coercion." *Encounter* 47:3 (Summer 1986): 267-273.

Hartshorne, Charles. *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.

Hartshorne, Charles. *Man's Vision of God: and the Logic of Theism*. New York: Willett, Clark & Company, 1941.

(See annotation in "3. Primarily Philosophical Texts" section.)

McDaniel, Jay B. *With Roots and Wings: Christianity in an age of Ecology and Dialogue*. New York: Orbis Books, 1995

Ogden, Schubert M. "Love Unbounded: The Doctrine of God." *The Perkins School of Theology Journal*. vol. 19, no. 3 (Spring 1996) 5-17.

Ogden argues that process theology can account for the central issues of love better than any other theology. This quote sums up the article well:

At worst, faith's testimony to God's love has been all but completely obscured by an idolatrous exaltation of absolute and unchanging Being, while, even at best, it has been given only [a] kind of broken or inconstant conceptual expression. . . . Consequently, the deep reason for a theological rejection of classical metaphysics is not that such an outlook no longer commends itself to reasonable men, important as it is that we should recognize that fact and face up to its implications. No, the more profound reason is that such a metaphysics never has allowed, and, in principle, never could allow, an appropriate theological explication of the central theme of Wesley's evangelical witness, that God is love (16).

Ogden's student, Mark Lloyd Taylor spells out the implications of Ogden's words in Taylor's own book, *God is Love*.

Pittenger, Norman. *The Lure of Divine Love: Human Experience and Christian Faith in a Process Perspective*. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1979.

Stone, Bryan P. and Thomas Jay Oord, eds. *Thy Nature and Thy Name is Love: Wesleyan and Process Theologies in Dialogue*. Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood, 2001.

This collection of essays brings together Wesleyans who are, for the most part, friendly to basic concepts in process theology. What makes the book especially attractive to those engaged in the science and love dialogue is that both of the theological traditions addressed herein, Wesleyan theology and process theology, affirm a vision of God whose essence is love. Both traditions emphasize the priority and universality of grace in ways that do not negate human responsibility. Both understand divine-human interaction in relational terms. And both theological visions are particularly amenable to evidence in theories and science. Both are interested in natural theology.

Essays particularly helpful for those considering the influence of love upon science are the following: "Process Theology and the Wesleyan Witness," by Schubert M. Ogden, "Process and Sanctification," by Bryan P. Stone, "Human Responsibility and the Primacy of Grace," by John B. Cobb, Jr., "Seeking a Response-able God: the Wesleyan Tradition and Process Theology," by Randy L. Maddox, "Reconceptions of Divine Power in John Wesley, Panentheism, and Trinitarian Theology," by Tyron L. Inbody, "A Process Wesleyan Theodicy: Freedom, Embodiment and the Almighty God," by Thomas J. Oord, "Compassion and Hope: Theology Born Out of Action," by Mary Elizabeth Mullino-Moore, and "John Wesley, Process Theology, and Consumerism," by Jay McDaniel and John L. Farthing. This collection of essays provides evidence of the current trends in Wesleyan and Process theologies, and it sets an agenda for scholars to address the nature of God and what it means to love.

Taylor, Mark Lloyd. *God is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner*. Atlanta: Scholar's, 1986.

Will, James E. *The Universal God: Justice, Love, and Peace in the Global Village*. Kentucky: John Knox Press, 1994.

Williams, Daniel Day. *The Spirit and the Forms of Love*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

(See annotation in “1. Classic Love Texts” section.)

*** Roman Catholic**

Arendt, Hannah. *Love and Saint Augustine*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Burnaby, John. *Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938.

D’Arcy, Martin Cyril. *The Heart and Mind of Love, Lion and Unicorn: A Study in Eros and Agape*. Cleveland: World, 1964.

(See annotation in “1. Classic Love Texts” section.)

Gilleman, Gerard. *The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology*. Maryland: Newman Press, 1961.

(See annotation in “2. Emphasis Upon Ethics” section.)

Rahner, Karl. *The Love of Jesus and the Love of Neighbor*. New York: Crossroad, 1983.

Spohn, William. *Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics*. New York: Continuum, 2000.

(See annotation in “2. Emphasis Upon Ethics” section.)

Taylor, Mark Lloyd. *God is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner*. Atlanta: Scholar's, 1986.

* *Sacred Texts*

Butler, Roy F. *The Meaning of Agapao and Phileo in the Greek New Testament*. Lawrence, Kans.: Coronado, 1977.

Butler examines all of the references to love in the New Testament. He finds that *agape* as verb or noun occurs 262 times in the New Testament; *philia* as verb or noun occurs 23 times, which does not include *philia*'s derivatives translated "kiss" or "brother" nor its adjectival and adverbial forms.

An examination of the entire New Testament reveals that both *agape* and *philia* are used in reference to (1) the Father's love for the Son, (2) the Lord's love for humans, (3) Jesus' love for humans, (4) human love for Jesus, and (5) human love for humans. Upon examining every instance of *agape* and *philia* in the New Testament, Butler concludes that for every utterance of *philia* there is an example of *agape* expressing nearly the same idea (70). Ironically, *agape* is the *only* love word of the two used to describe the love of humans for Jesus and God, a fact placing in question Anders Nygren's preference for labeling human response as faith rather than *agape*. Furthermore, the verb form of *agape* is *never* used to speak of God's love for humans in the Synoptic Gospels, another fact that should have led Nygren to reconsider his thesis.

Fretheim, Terence E. *The Suffering God: An Old Testament Perspective*. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984.

Fretheim argues that the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament writings affirm that humans affect God. These writings do so by implying that God is not immutable or impassible: the actions, thoughts, and desires of creatures affect God. This work is especially important for theists in the Judeo-Christian-Muslim traditions who believe that a view of a static and unchanging deity cannot correspond with core implications of the claim that God is love.

God, according to the Old Testament witness, changes in light of what occurs in the creaturely realm. God is wounded by human disobedience (Jer. 3:19-20); God grieves because of human rebellion (Ps. 78:40-41, Isa. 63:7-10); God wails and

mourns (Jer. 48:30-32, Amos 5:1-2); God becomes angry over sin (Hos. 8:5, Ez. 16:42); God waits for human response (Jer. 13:27); God suffers with humans in compassion (Isa. 54:7-8, Judg. 2:18). Humans possess real power, real freedom, and their actions really affect both the future and God. Nearly forty references to divine repentance are found in the Old Testament; and most of these instances are the direct result of human activity. Even passages suggesting that God displays wrath are coherent only if humans truly affect God. The God described in the Old Testament is not immutable but mutates in give-and-take relationships with creatures.

Furnish, Victor Paul. *The Love Command in the New Testament*. Nashville: Abingdon, 1972.

Moffatt, James. *Love in the New Testament*. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1930.

Moffatt's work on love, although dated by nearly seventy-five years, is a classic and remains today perhaps the clearest and deepest analysis of love in the New Testament. In particular, Moffatt addresses the key Christian phrase, God is love.

After noting all of the passages in the New Testament pertaining to love, Moffatt concludes that the distinctiveness of Christianity is that Christians regard themselves as being loved by God. Furthermore, Christianity was initiated and finds at its center One who not only taught love, but lived it perfectly: Jesus Christ. Responding to those Nygren and others who claim that the word, "eros" is not in the great Corinthian love hymn because Paul meant to emphasize the difference between *agape* and desire for God, Moffatt argues instead that Paul's intent was to refrain from using a word the Corinthians would identify with vulgarity.

Those in the science-and-love dialogue who privilege Christian scripture would do well to mine the deep resources of this classic biblical reference on love.

Mollenkott, Virginia. *The Divine Feminine: The Biblical Imagery of God as Female*. New York: Crossroad, 1983.

(See annotation in "Feminist" segment of "4. Primarily Religious" section.)

Placher, William C. *Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture*.

Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994.

Like Terence Fretheim's work, Placher's book is important for theists in the Jewish-Christian-Muslim traditions who want to deny that God is aloof and unchanging in order to affirm that God is love.

Placher asks what sort of God would one believe in if one took the biblical narratives, especially the New Testament stories about Jesus, as the best clue to who God is. His answer: "God is the one who loves in freedom, and in that free love God is vulnerable, willing to risk suffering" (xv). The patripassion of the Cross of Christ illustrates that the New Testament message entails the message that what occurs in the finite realm affects God. If the parables of Jesus, especially those regarding "the lost sheep," "the lost coin," and "the lost son," express the sorrow and joys God experiences when affected by others, they also serve as compelling arguments against divine immutability.

Sakenfeld, Katharine Doob. *Faithfulness in Action: Loyalty in Biblical Perspective*. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985.

The study focuses upon the Hebrew word "hesed" found in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament. The author argues that "hesed," often translated as "steadfast love," has supremely to do with loyalty in love. "The Bible is clear that such a life style of loyalty depends in every way upon God's faithfulness. Divine faithfulness provides a model of loyalty which takes commitment radically seriously" (137).

Smedes, Lewis B. *Love Within Limits: A Realist's View of 1 Corinthians 13*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1978.

* *Wesleyan*

Maas, Robin. *Crucified Love: The Practice of Christian Perfection*. Nashville: Abingdon, 1989.

Stone, Bryan P. and Thomas Jay Oord, eds. *Thy Nature and Thy Name is Love: Wesleyan and Process Theologies in Dialogue*. Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood, 2001.

(See annotation in “Process Theology” segment of “4. Primarily Religious” section.)

Wynkoop, Mildred Bangs. *A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism*. Kansas City: Beacon Hill, 1972.

This is a modern-day classic in Wesleyanism and love theology. The author offers this theological exposition as a defense of her thesis that John Wesley’s theology provides the most adequate footing for a theology of love. “It is this author’s considered opinion,” contends Wynkoop, “that John Wesley has contributed a sound and useable approach to theology which is worthy of consideration in the solutions of the problems related to the theology-life syndrome. His ‘hermeneutic’ was ‘love to God and man.’ This theme runs throughout his works. At least when each doctrine of the Christian faith is identified and defined by him, the basic meaning invariably comes out ‘love.’ Wesley’s thought is like a great rotunda with archway entrances all around it. No matter which one is entered it always leads to the central Hall of Love, where, looking upward toward the dome, one gazes into the endless, inviting sky. There is no ceiling to love” (16). Although the vast majority of the book is given over to John Wesley’s theology, Wynkoop acknowledges her indebtedness to the process theology of Daniel Day Williams.

The thesis of the book is that the dynamic of Wesleyanism is love. Rather than representing Wesley’s theology as a theology of holiness, the author believes that it is more faithful to call Wesley’s thought a theology of love. Wesleyan theology has its roots in the major themes of the Bible, including the fact that God loves the world, Christ loved the church, Jesus demands total love to God and neighbor, the ethics of Christian life is summed up in love, and a right relationship with God is one based upon love.

The bulk of the work consists of the author’s identification of love as the core to central theological doctrines. Topics addressed include the divine-human interaction, grace, faith, purity and a clean heart, Christian perfection, sanctification. This statement stands as a summation of Wynkoop’s argument: “The summarizing word – Wesley’s ultimate hermeneutic -- is *love*. Every strand of his thought, the warm heart of every doctrine, the passion of every sermon, the test of every claim to Christian grace, was love. So central is love that to be “Wesleyan” is to be committed to a theology of love” (101).

5. PRIMARILY SCIENTIFIC:

Browning, Don. *Religious Thought and Modern Psychologies: A Critical Conversation in the Theology of Culture*. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987.

The purpose of the book, as the author puts it, is to “uncover the ethical and metaphysical horizon of some of the major contemporary psychotherapeutic psychologies” (ix). To do this, the author analyzes implicit principles of obligation and what the author calls “deep metaphors” imbedded in and around conceptualities of psychology. Browning’s work in this book has been vital reading for those engaging in issues related to psychology and religion.

Presuppositions and resources in the Jewish and Christian religious traditions inform Browning’s critique. Among the dominant psychologies that the author addresses are those of Freud, Jung, behavioral psychology, humanistic psychology, and Erickson. The dominant religious figures used to criticize and engage the psychologies include Reinhold Niebuhr, William James, and Paul Ricoeur.

The author believes that modern psychologies are indispensable for modern life and that they should be evaluated for the ways in which they play the role of religion in modern thinking. Clinical psychologies cannot avoid a metaphysical and ethical horizon. A major assumption made by the author is that “traditional religion and modern psychology stand in a special relation to one another because both of them provide concepts and technologies for the ordering of the interior life” (2).

The author labels various contemporary psychologies as “cultures.” He associates Freud with, what he calls, “the culture of detachment”; the culture of detachment sees the world as basically hostile and humans are largely self-absorbed creatures with only small amounts of energy for larger altruistic ventures. Humanistic psychologies and Jung are variations of what he calls the “culture of joy”; the culture of joy sees the world as basically harmonious. Skinner is the example of the “culture of control”; the culture of control sees humans primarily as controlled and controllable by their environment. Erickson and Kohut are examples of the “culture of care;” the culture of care grasps the tensions and anxieties of life and gravitates toward an ethics that finds a place for both self-love and self-transcending love for the other.

Browning finds most affinities between Christian thought and the culture of care in the thought of Erickson. “It is my thesis that significant portions of modern psychologies, and especially the clinical psychologies, are actually instances of religio-ethical thinking” (8). “It is not only in theology,” claims Browning, “but, to a surprising extent, in the modern psychologies as well, that the way we metaphorically represent the world in its most durable and ultimate respects, influences what we think and what we think we are obligated to do” (20). When addressing the Freudian-based modern psychologies, the author argues that psychoanalysis oscillates between ethical egoism and cautious reciprocity. By contrast, Christianity celebrates the principle of self-giving love and justice.

The critical chapter of the book comes in chapter 6, “Making Judgments about Deep Metaphors and Obligations.” In it, Browning addresses the central or deep metaphor of Christianity, namely that the ideal of human fulfillment comes from the notion of self-sacrificial

love as *agape*. Browning looks at the works of Anders Nygren, Reinhold Niebuhr and Gene Outka. Modern psychologies have put pressure on theology to build a greater place for self-regard into theology's model of human fulfillment. The *caritas* model found in the work of theologians such as Louis Janssens provide a model of *agape* that has a place for both self-sacrificial love and also the mutuality of neighbor-to-neighbor love. This model has the virtue also of incorporating insights on the importance of self-regard without overemphasizing self-regard to the detriment of equal regard for the other. It is this *caritas* model to which the modern psychologies of Erickson and Kohut come closest.

Clark, Stanley G. "Can Scientists Make Love?" *The Nature and Pursuit of Love: The Philosophy of Irving Singer*. David Goicoechea, ed. Prometheus Press, 1995.

Fine, Reuben, *The Meaning of Love in Human Experience*. New York: Wiley, 1985.

Fromm, Erich. *The Art of Loving*. New York: Harper and Row, 1956.

(See annotation in "1. Classic Love Texts" section.)

Hefner, Philip. *The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion*. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993.

Hefner's book is an enterprise in making sense of Christian faith in the context of contemporary scientific knowledge and experience. The author aims at a theological anthropology in the light of the natural sciences. In other words, the book wrestles with the question of *who* human beings are, *what* they are, and what they are alive *for*. Hefner positions himself in what he calls the Hebrew/Jewish/Christian stream.

The book's arguments are set before the reader in clear fashion. First, he argues that humans are thoroughly natural creatures having emerged from natural evolutionary processes. These processes have produced culture, and humans are members of culture. Second, the planet is in critical condition and it is the challenge of humans to fashion a viable system of cultural information to fulfill their human nature in this ecosystem. Third, myth and ritual, which emerged somewhere between 100 thousand and 20 thousand years ago, provide information to enhance human life in its present threatened conditions. And finally, we are required today to use science and myth to

offer proposals for the direction, meaning and purposes of humanity.

Hefner's influential theory of humans as "co-creators" is developed fully in this book. The theory of the co-creator involves three aspects. One, "the human being is created by God to be a co-creator in the creation that God has brought into being and for which God has purposes. Two, the conditioning matrix that has produced the human being--the evolutionary process -- is God's process of bringing into being a creature who represents the creation's zone of a new stage of freedom and who, therefore, is crucial for the emergence of a free creation. Three, the freedom that marks the created co-creator and its culture is an instrumentality of God for enabling the creation (consisting of the evolutionary past of genetic and cultural inheritance as well as contemporary ecosystem) to participate in the intentional fulfillment of God's purposes" (32).

The author's proposals related to love, altruism and morality come near the end of the book. Hefner is well aware of and critiques various theories related to altruism proposed by philosophers and scientists. He suggests that "our moral action of love for God and neighbor is our way of living in harmony with the way things really are" (191). In other words, the love that God has for us and our love for God and neighbor places us in the all-encompassing symbolic universe that drives the Christian tradition.

The Christian myth entails that "all morality presupposes and is response to the prior love of God for us, a love that seeks our well-being and the fulfillment of that for which we have been created" (194). Nature itself is an ambiance in which humans belong and that enables humans to fulfill the purpose for which they were brought into being. "The central reality that undergirds all concrete experience and to which we continually seek to adapt," claims Hefner, "is disposed toward us in a way that we can interpret as graciousness and beneficent support" (194).

The author devotes a chapter in his book to altruism and Christian love. He argues that the concepts of altruism articulated in evolutionary biology focus on the same phenomenon as the love command of the Hebrew/Christian tradition. The evolutionary, biocultural sciences approach beneficent behavior from the perspective of natural history of life. Myth and ritual, however, approach this phenomenon from the perspective of human culture. Christian theology should interpret beneficent behavior as an expression of the basic cosmological and ontological principles. In addition, Christianity should consider altruism to be an intrinsic value, rooted in the fundamental character of reality.

Lewis, Thomas, Fari Amini, and Richard Lannon. *A General Theory of Love*. New York: Random House, 2000.

These three authors use creative literary style and scientific research to argue for the

great importance and influence of the brain upon the nature and expression of love. The book is written for a general but scholarly audience. Our brains link us with those people to whom we love and as a consequence who we are, and who we become depends in great part on whom we love. It is the body's physiology that ensures our relationships and identities.

The authors lament that from the beginning of the 20th century to its end, the most influential accounts of love rarely, if ever, mentioned biology. Although the authors point to important links between physiology and love, they do not claim to have solved all of the mysteries of love. This book's thesis or agenda is described well when the authors asked this question: "What can the structure and design of the brain tell us about the nature of love?" (18)

One of the main theses of the book is that understanding love begins with understanding feelings rather than the reason. "Emotion is the messenger of love; it is the vehicle that carries every signal from one brimming heart to another" (37).

The authors document well the profound effects that various regions of the mind have upon human behavior. For instance, the authors note that patients who have lost the hippocampi bear witness to the memory aspect of this region of the brain, because no explicit memories can be created without a hippocampus.

The authors note the profound importance of relationships. "The astounding legacy of our combined status as mammals and neural beings is limbic revision: the power to remodel the emotional parts of the people we love, as our attractors activate certain limbic pathways, and the brain's inexorable memory mechanism reinforces them" (144). However, the neurostructures responsible for emotional lives are not infinitely adaptable in relationship.

The book concludes with these words: "The adventure of seeking a theory of love is far from over. While science can afford a closer glimpse of this tower or that soaring wall, the heart's castle still hangs high in the heavens, shrouded in scudding clouds and obscured by mist. Will science ever announce the complete revelation of all love's secrets? Will empiricism ever trace an unbroken path from the highest stone to the heart's castle down to the bedrock of certitude? Of course not! We demand too much if we expect single-handed empiricism to define and lay bare the human soul" (230).

Monroe, Kristen. *The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

The author considers various influences that produce or encourage altruism by addressing empirical evidence for altruism. This evidence of altruism provides insights into the strengths and limitations of various theories about human behavior that typically emphasize individual self interest. Monroe develops her own theory for why altruism emerges, in which she argues that altruists have a different way of seeing things or a different perspective about the world and how to live in it. She concludes that the self-interest paradigms that dominate explanations of human behavior produce only limited explanations for altruism.

In the book's opening segment, Monroe confronts various definitions of altruism. She ends up defining altruism as "action designed to benefit another, even at the risk of significant harm to the actor's own well-being" (4). Various approaches to understanding altruism have proven dissatisfying. The traditional economic, socio-cultural, biological, and psychological understandings of human nature cannot explain adequately altruism as Monroe defines it. One's perspective, i.e. how one views the world, themselves, and others and how each are related, captures the importance of understanding altruism.

In the second part of the book, Monroe pieces together various narratives from interviews of those who act altruistically. Her interviews are of types of individuals she labels "entrepreneurs," "philanthropists," "heroes and heroines," and "rescuers" of Jews in Nazi Europe. Following the narratives, Monroe systematically examines the traditional explanations of altruism from economics, evolutionary biology, and psychology.

Surprisingly, Monroe finds that among the altruists she interviews, few if any considered religion relevant to their altruistic acts. Altruists did identify a spiritual feeling of closeness to others or a belief that all humans are a part of a large family. She concludes that what generates altruistic acts is the individual seeing themselves and others as humans of valuable.

Monroe addresses various other social and cultural factors that some have suggested induce altruism, and she found these factors as not important in the narratives she collects. When examining economic explanations, Monroe concludes that "altruism is one area in which the limitations of the economic approach are abundantly evident" (160). Her conclusion after examining explanations of altruism from evolutionary theory is that these theories do not specify the origin of altruism nor do they help contribute to the understanding of the most extreme forms of altruistic behavior. To those who argue that altruism comes from the education and socialization patterns handed down from authorities, Monroe replies "it was the rescuers, precisely those individuals who come closest to approaching pure altruism in my sample and who most frequently expressed the universal moral principles of the highest stage of moral development, who deviated most wildly from their learned ethical beliefs, and they did so precisely in order to save victims of Nazi persecution. Their altruism necessitated this deviation from their learned ethical systems" (194).

In the fourth and final section, Monroe offers her own theory as a basis for understanding human nature, particularly expressions of altruism. Monroe found that the most relative, cognitive component of the altruists she interviewed centered upon (1) their particular world views and (2) their expectations about what constitutes normal behavior. Altruism became "a logical outgrowth of their sense of a self in relation to others" (197).

Altruists described their world-view as universalistic in the sense that they valued all of human life and often all of non-human life. Rescuers, for instance, were not motivated by the belief that the world is ultimately fair, nor did self-image seem to become a major factor in altruism, nor did the feel obligations because of felt communal ties. Instead "altruists have a particular perspective in which all mankind is connected through a common humanity, in which each individual is linked to all others and to a world in which all living beings are entitled to a certain humane treatment merely by virtue of being alive" (206).

Monroe concludes her analysis by claiming that “humanity plus need: this is the only moral reasoning, the only calculus for altruism” (212). While she admits that it may be possible that various mechanisms precipitate development or growth of an altruistic perspective, it is the perspective itself, she claims, that constitutes the heart of altruism. The altruistic perspective consists of a common perception, held by all altruists, that they are strongly linked to others through a shared humanity. The closing pages entail an ethical-political theory based upon the primary notion that one’s sense of self in relation to others is the fundamental concept for ethics.

Montagu, Ashley. ed. *The Meaning of Love*. New York: Julian, 1953.

(See annotation in “1. Classic Love Texts” section.)

Oliner, Pearl M., Samuel P. Oliner, Lawrence Baron, Lawrence A. Blum, Dennis L. Krebs, M. Zuzanna Smolenska. Eds. *Embracing the Other: Philosophical, Psychological, and Historical Perspectives on Altruism*. New York: New York University Press, 1992.

This book of essays is the product of a 1989 project that focused on people who were willing, despite grave risk and consequence, to rescue Jews during the Holocaust. The goal of the book is to instigate thought about the implication of the studies on altruism for different spheres of social life. The conference was composed of scholars from a multitude of disciplines and nations. The topics they write about range from the highly theoretical to the strongly pragmatic. Essayists largely agree that it is the issue of motivation that is essential to an adequate notion of altruism. Each of the chapters in this book deals with the promotion of pro-social behavior and concern for the other.

The book is broken into five major sections. The first addresses philosophical, definitional, and conceptual issues related to altruism. Krzysztof Konarzewski argues that heroic altruism requires both empathy with the other and protest – two quite different motivational orientations. The protest has to do with independence based upon commitment to foundations of community life. Lawrence Blum argues that rescue involves moral principles beyond those merely of altruism. The altruistic personality appreciates other values beyond altruism itself. Victor Seidler criticizes the overvaluing of reason-duty to the neglect of emotion-based motivation like compassion. Rather than traditions such as Christianity that emphasize ethical purity, Seidler suggests that the tradition of Judaism, which accepts emotion, self and individuality as well as social context as a more adequate approach.

The second section is titled, “Sociobiology and Moral Altruism.” The authors

of two chapters in this section, Ian Vine and Ronald Cohen, reject exclusively biological-based altruism or exclusively cultural-based models and adopt the both/and model of biology and culture. Genes provide a range of possible behaviors, but it is culture and learning that shape the selection of that range.

The third section is entitled “The Development and Enactment of Altruism.” Dennis Krebs and Frank van Hesteren argue that all people to a greater or lesser degree express altruism, and the capacity for altruism grows with social and cognitive development. Krebs and van Hesteren proposed a “developmental-interactionist” model consisting of seven cognitively based stage structures. Maria Jarymowicz argues for what she calls an “exocentric altruism” that stems from centering on the other. This altruism is more likely to result in an appropriate response when directed toward those who are dissimilar to the altruist. Those with a low self distinctiveness experience identity problems and are, therefore, more likely to discriminate against dissimilar “out-group” others. Individuals with an extensive identification with a sense of connectedness to others tend to behave more altruistically than individuals with more limited identities. Chapters by Zuzanna Smolenska, Janusz Reykowski, Leo Montada, and Elizabeth Midlarsky’s proposed theories from empirical studies on altruism among those with a variety of ages and backgrounds.

The fourth section, titled “Embracing the Outsider,” includes essays addressing altruistic behavior toward particular people groups. Richard Hovannisian examines the acts of Turks who saved the lives of Armenians during the genocide of 1915. Lawrence Baron and Ewa Kurek-Lisik look at the Dutch involvement of rescuing the Jews during the Holocaust. They also examine the actions of Polish nuns who saved Jewish children. Finally, Rachel Hertz-Lazarowitz tells the story of a passionate Israeli who fought the war of independence against Lebanon and subsequently devoted all of his time to helping the Palestinians against whom he fought.

The final section of the book addresses issues pertaining to what is involved in the promotion of altruistic acts and altruistic bonds. After noting that rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust were marked by what might be called extensivity—which is a dual orientation toward the attachments in interpersonal relationships as well as an inclusive sense of obligation toward multiple groups—Pearl and Samuel Oliner propose 8 social processes that might encourage and extensive orientation. Rescuers of Jews had a propensity to assume obligations and social responsibility for all other human beings, perceiving them as worthy and deserving of help as well as empathy. Ervin Staub asks about the kind of socialization that might be required to raise caring and cooperative helpful persons. He argues that children with connected identities are more likely to be pro-social and altruistic. Daniel Boland cites the case of Alcoholics Anonymous as a concrete case of altruism. Wendy Heller and Hoda Mahmoudi argue that adherents of the Baha’i faith learn extensive altruistic norms through the central teaching of this religious tradition. In the book’s final chapter, Wiktor Osiatynski looks at the former Soviet Union and the Russian Orthodox Church. Osiatynski develops the idea that philanthropy and charity may be possible in a paternalistic or autocratic collectivist

society, but altruism cannot exist in this sort of society.

Peters, Ted. *For the Love of Children: Genetic Technology and the Future of the Family*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1996.

Polkinghorne, John, ed. *The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001.

(See annotation in “Other” segment of “4. Primarily Religious” section.)

Pope, Stephen J. *The Evolution of Altruism and the Ordering of Love*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994.

(See annotation in “Other” segment of “4. Primarily Religious” section.)

Post, Stephen G., Lynn G. Underwood, Jeffrey S. Schloss, and William B. Hurlbutt, eds. *Altruism and Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Dialogue*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

This volume includes the work of some of the leading figures in the science and religion love dialogue. The essays are the product of a conference entitled “Empathy, Altruism and *Agape*: Perspectives on Love in Science and Religion.” Major funding for this 1999 conference came from the John Templeton Foundation and John Fetzer Institute.

“It is in the context of the dialogue between science, philosophy and spiritual traditions that this book addresses various views of the roles of altruism and egoism,” writes editor Stephen G. Post (5). “Our intent in this book is to grapple honestly with current scientific questions about the existence of genuine altruism and to explore the nature of human other regarding motives and acts” (6). Among the tasks that the book addresses is the effort to understand better the emergence of altruism and empathy and how these contribute a greater capacity to love.

The book is organized into five sections. In the first, four essayists wrestle with the definitions of altruism, *agape*, and love. Elliott Sober defines altruistic behavior in his essay as enhancing the fitness of someone else at some cost in fitness to the donor. Sober’s own position on the emergence of altruism and egoism is a pluralistic one in the sense that Sober

recognizes that humans and other organisms have both egoistic and altruistic inclinations. Edith Wyschogrod writes as a phenomenologist who claims that moral experience begins with a claim upon the self to engage in other regarding acts. In this sense ethical meaning arises in the encounter with another human. Jerome Kagan, a psychologist, asserts that the human being is utterly unique emergent from evolution with a moral sense. It was with the evolution of the human brain that humans could evaluate vice and virtue. Stephen G. Post examines the tradition of *agape* in light of altruism and altruistic love. According to Post, altruistic love does not eclipse the care of the self, but it effectively affirms participation in the being of the other. “Altruism is other regarding, either with regard to actions or motivations; altruistic adds the features of deep affirmative affect to altruism; *agape* is altruistic love universalized all humanity as informed by theistic commitments” (56). Despite universalization, however, “*agape* forces us to honestly the ordering of our love and care with respect to both the nearest and the very neediest on the face of the earth” (59).

The second section of the book takes up the social scientific research and addresses this in this relationship to altruism and love. This section notes that observing or measuring motivations with regard to love is very difficult. Lynn Underwood addresses data from selected studies and attempts to map a conceptuality of love from the social science perspective. She wrestles with basic notions of love, self, context and freedom among other things. In his essay, C. Daniel Batson challenges the common assumption that all behavior is selfish. Batson’s “empathy/altruism” hypothesis is that other-oriented emotional response evokes a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing the other’s welfare. Batson looks at more than 25 experiments to distinguish between self-directed motives and truly altruistic motives. Batson says that the tentative conclusion from his studies is that feeling empathy for a person in need does evoke altruistic motivation to help that person.

Kristen Renwick Monroe defines altruism in terms of actions rather than motives. Monroe suggests that perception of the self in relation to others strongly affects decisions to be altruistic. Finally, Samuel Oliner analyzes altruistic behaviors of rescuers of Jews during WWII and volunteers working with the dying. He characterizes altruism as actions that are (1) directed toward another, (2) involve a high risk or sacrifice to the actor, (3) are accompanied by no external reward and (4) voluntary. After examining data of the two groups, both the rescuers and those involved in hospice, Oliner concludes that there is no single motivating explanation that triggers people to behave compassionately for the welfare of others. However, Gentile rescuers who risked their lives for Jews had learned compassion, caring norms, and responsibility for diverse others from parents and others in authority. Hospice volunteers exhibited a higher degree of intrinsic religiosity, despite a lower incidence of affiliation with mainstream religious traditions. Oliner suggests that social institutions, whether they be religious, educational or in the workplace, need to reconsider their roles and responsibilities so that they might foster kind and loving acts.

The third section of the book takes up the debates within evolutionary biology and psychology with regard to egoism and altruism. Michael Ruse outlines the genecentric sociobiological perspective on altruism. He asserts that a Darwinian interpretation of social behavior and morality requires that organisms be reproductively beneficial. Stephen Pope

addresses the varieties of love from the perspective of theology and biology and speaks of an ordering of loves. Pope suggests that appropriate altruism comes out of who we are rather than being an imposition that occurs contrary to our deepest native needs and desires. “I believe the goods valued by both the moral egoists and the moral altruists can be assimilated and properly coordinated within a balanced interpretation of the ordering of love” (170). David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober consider the history of altruism and evolutionary biology. They note the fluctuation that the history of altruism has had but hope that altruism will find a permanent place in dominant evolutionary thinking.

Melvin Konner reviews data from evolutionary biology, primatology, and anthropology. He describes obstacles to altruism and notes that evolutionary theory makes most disinterested forms of altruism problematic. In particular, aggression in both non-humans and humans makes altruism problematic. Jeffrey P. Schloss surveys evolutionary approaches to human cooperative behavior and notes that the good news is that current theory is conciliatory in its affirmation of that natural basis for genuine other regard within kinship or social groups. The challenging news, however, is that the counterpart of such affiliation is exclusion towards those outside those groups. There is no biological theory proposed for how out-group sacrifice and “love your enemy” altruism can come about. “If the struggle for existence is the engine of natural selection and survival of the fittest is the direction of travel, then those organisms that sacrifice their biological well-being for the good of another will be kicked off the train” (214).

The fourth section of the book considers the emotional aspects of altruistic love by focusing on the role of empathy in both humans and non-humans. This section discusses the evolutionary advantages of particular anatomical, physiological, and psychological developments. Essayists consider how developments in these fields provide a basis for varied forms of altruism. Neuroscientist Thomas Insel discusses his work in neurochemistry and neurophysiology in rodent species. His findings point to the possibility that in human beings subtle genetic variations may underlie individual differences in the capacity and inclination for attachment and other forms of altruistic behavior. Neurologist Antonio Damasio discusses evolutionary origins of emotions and feelings, their fundamental adaptive value, and the extension in the empathetic processes that allow human sociality and altruism. He notes that the emotions use the body as their theater. The foundational processes of emotion and feeling, coupled with an individual’s ability to know of the existence of such emotions and feelings in the self and others, are the basis of what is best in humans, including conscience, ethical rules and the codification of law. Hanna Damasio discusses case reports of patients with damage to the portion of the brain that appear critical in the foundational processes of altruism. She concludes that there is a system in certain sections of the prefrontal cortex that is critical for the learning and maintenance of certain aspects of social behavior that pertain to interpersonal relationships. Damage to this results in defective decisions regarding altruism. Her work underscores the claim that the capacity for altruism has a physical foundation.

Primatologists Stephanie Preston and Frans deWaal consider the behaviors and linkage between humans and non-humans. They report on what appears to be a degree of cognitive empathy among the great apes. Empathy is a general class of behavior that exists across species to different degrees of complexity. The data from primatology warns against drawing

demarcation lines between humans and other animals with respect to emotional aspects of empathy. The basis in emotional and social connectedness is crucial to an understanding of empathy and altruism because it creates the bridge between ultimate and proximate explanations and between phylogeny and ontogeny. William B. Hurlbut concludes the section with his own chapter on empathy, evolution, and altruism. He claims that the beginning of sociality are seen even in the most primordial configurations of living matter. “Among the earliest lifeforms, organisms drew information from one another to pattern and coordinate such basic biological functions as reproduction and nourishment” (310). Empathy is a form of intersubjectivity in which the observer actually participates in the feelings of the other. Hurlbut notes that the idea the human life has a moral dimension and this is in some sense a product of the universe is at odds with prevailing scientific culture. To assert an objective ethical order within nature would be to affirm teleology, the reality of human freedom, and the unique status of our species. Hurlbut argues that “for all the controversy concerning the possibility of genuine generosity and altruistic love, at the levels of life, amid the sounds of the street and the strivings and struggles, there is everywhere, in small or greater degrees, the evidence of love. Many people, perhaps most, in some way give the effort and energy of their lives from a belief in love and the desire to build a better world. If there is a natural sentiment and hope, it is that love is real” (325).

The fifth section looks at altruistic love from a religious context. Don S. Browning suggests that evolutionary biology is moving religious thinkers toward a synthesis model in which love is understood as having both altruistic and egoistic aspects. Browning argues that the moral theologian “would finally ground the sacrificial element in love on the Christian’s belief in the infinite value of the other and on the sense that some acts of self sacrifice are both willed and empowered by God, even though self-sacrifice, as such, might not be seen as the central goal of Christian love” (344). Gregory L. Fricchione interprets human religious expression as an outgrowth of evolutionary developments centered around separation and attachment theory. Fricchione claims “separation/attachment is a common referent conferring extensional identity across different conceptual levels of complexity” (354). *Agape* is a healthy synthesis of self-affirming/self-realizing love with self-giving love. Reuben L. F. Habito concludes the volume by speaking of compassion and love from a Buddhist perspective. The compassionate life from a Buddhist perspective is an outflow of the wisdom that truly sees the way things are. The view of reality that overcomes the separation of self and other. Habito suggests that Buddhism offers a valuable contribution in forging a common future as the earth community.

Rolston, Holmes. *Genes, Genesis and God*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

This text is the product of Rolston’s Gifford Lectures of 1997. His basic task is to relate cultural genesis to natural genesis and understand how value in culture has its links to value in nature. While Rolston argues for a continuity of culture and biological nature, he also contends that culture exceeds and emerges out of biology, so that

genuine novelty occurs. In fact, Rolston believes that science, ethics and religion are emergent phenomenon in culture. He uses these three domains “for the generating, conserving, and distributing of values as test cases, demanding their incorporation into the larger picture of what is taking place on our planet” (xiii).

Much of the first third of the book addresses genetic theory, and Rolston surveys a wide variety of literature in this field. Perhaps one of the strengths of this book is the author’s command of the wide literature pertaining to the subjects he addresses.

The final third of the book addresses issues related to ethics, love and religion. Although Rolston affirms value in nature, he does not believe that there is any ethics in nature. He examines and critiques various biological theories related to egoism and altruism. In the model he promotes, “one needs value naturalized as well as ethics humanized; then ethics will require appropriate respect for value, whether human or non-human” (280).

Rolston argues that ethics arise out of evolutionary natural history. It is a history in which values have already been arising. “Such genesis of ethics, distinctive to the human genius, testifies both to human uniqueness, emergent from natural history, and to the creative power evidenced in the spontaneous genetics, the primal source now transcended with the appearance of genuine and universal caring and altruism” (280).

From ethics emerges religion, and the capacity to be religious evolved within or emerged out of natural systems where there was no such capacity in non-humans. Rolston advocates a naturalizing of religion, by which he does not mean that religion can be explained away naturalistically. Rather the naturalizing of religion means that religion is generated by the human confrontation with the forces of nature. This means that religion comes as a response to prolific Earth.

While religion involves more than altruism, Rolston argues that altruism plays an important part in a variety of religious traditions. Religion functions to generate innovative ethical behavior, which in turn makes possible the human spirit. This spirit cannot exist outside a social covenant, however. Religion, then, is an emergent property from complex biodiversity through evolutionary history. In this emergence, God plays a role.

Rose, Hilary. *Love, Power and Knowledge: Towards a Feminist Transformation of the Sciences*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Sorokin, Pitirim. *The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation*. Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation, (1954) 2002.

(See annotation in “1. Classic Love Texts” section.)

Walsh, Anthony. *The Science of Love: Understanding Love and Its Effects on Mind and Body*. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1991.

Walsh is a sociologist who investigates the current scientific research and what it entails for how we understand various forms of love. The author intends to understand love in all its particulars, including its scientific basis. He defines love as that which “satisfies one’s need to receive and bestow affection and nurturance; to give and be given assurances of value, respect, acceptance and appreciation; and to feel secure in a unity with, and belonging to, a particular family, as well as the human family” (9). Walsh laments that even social scientists who explore behavior have infrequently studied love. He is convinced, however, that humans must probe the nature of love and learn how to generate it and sustain it.

The book is divided into three sections. The first, entitled “Skin Love,” deals with the importance of love in early infancy. Included in this section are chapters exploring the importance of touch and tenderness upon infants in their first experience of love. Walsh also addresses how messages of love affect the structure and function of the infant’s developing brain. A chapter is devoted to the differences between male and female parental love upon children. The impact of loving care upon the triune nature of the brain is also examined. It is Walsh’s contention that “love is not merely theologically or philosophically desirable, but it is also a biological and psychological necessity” (37).

In the second section, Walsh examines what he calls, “kin love,” by which he means the loving ties with one’s fellow human beings. In examining kin love, the author investigates the psychological and physical problems associated with the absence or deprivation of love. He notes that children suffering from psycho-social dwarfism are severely retarded in physical growth. Walsh notes the negative effects upon the immune system and the susceptibility to disease that those experience who have not been loved adequately. He also points out that love deprivation may interact with social and biological correlates of schizophrenia. Research details the importance that love plays in prevention of suicide; love also is a deterrent for drug and alcohol abuse. In a chapter devoted to criminology, Walsh shows the disturbing statistics by detailing the correlation between lawlessness and the lack of giving and being given love. In the section’s final chapter, he argues that some social forms are conducive to love and some are inimical.

The book’s third segment, which Walsh titles “In Love,” deals with romance and how romantic love is generated and sustained. The origin of sex is addressed, as well as the way chemicals in the brain and body effect one’s romantic inclinations. Walsh looks at the different ways in which humans -- both males and females -- choose partners and what each finds attractive in the other. Included in this section are Walsh’s thoughts about scientific evidence for monogamy, promiscuity, and orgasm. Throughout

all three sections, the author relies heavily upon scientific data and the theories of prominent scientists to unravel theories of love that correspond with the work of science.